CVE-2026-68519 — glances
Fix: nicolargo/glances@5c07c0dCVE-2026-68519 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in glances. A fix is available for glances — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Glances: `--disable-config-exec` does not cover on-alert action commands (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53925)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-68519.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
glancesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In Glances 4.5.5 the --disable-config-exec flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop secure_popen() from
interpreting the shell operators &&, | and > in AMP command values taken from the configuration file. The
hardening was not applied to the on-alert action command path, which reads its command lines from the same
configuration file. As a result, with --disable-config-exec enabled, a configured alert action that contains >
(file redirection), && (chaining) or | (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file
write / command chaining at the privilege of the glances process when the alert triggers.
Affected code
glances/actions.py (Glances 4.5.5, latest):
ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # line 111 — no allow_operators=, defaults to True
By contrast the AMP modules were fixed:
# glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69
self.set_result(secure_popen(res, allow_operators=self.allow_operators()).rstrip())
# glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60
res = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'), allow_operators=self.allow_operators())
PoC (benign)
glances.conf:
[cpu]
user_critical=1
user_critical_action=echo MARKER > /tmp/poc_marker
Run glances --disable-config-exec and generate CPU load. When the cpu user alert reaches CRITICAL, /tmp/poc_marker
is created — i.e. the > operator was interpreted despite --disable-config-exec. The same > in an [amp_*]
command value is correctly not interpreted.
Impact
Arbitrary file write (>), command chaining (&&) and pipe (|) from config-defined alert actions, contrary to the
guarantee of --disable-config-exec. Trust boundary = the glances configuration file.
Suggested fix
Pass allow_operators=not args.disable_config_exec from GlancesActions.run() into secure_popen() (GlancesActions
already holds args).
Credit
Reported via responsible-disclosure incomplete-fix measurement study.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | glances | all versions | 4.5.6pip install --upgrade 'glances==4.5.6' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for glances, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update glances to 4.5.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-68519 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-68519 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.