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🐍 PyPI
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-68519 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in glances. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-68519 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Glances: `--disable-config-exec` does not cover on-alert action commands (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53925)

Published
Aug 17, 2026
Updated
Aug 17, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-68519.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍glances

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

In Glances 4.5.5 the --disable-config-exec flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop secure_popen() from interpreting the shell operators &&, | and > in AMP command values taken from the configuration file. The hardening was not applied to the on-alert action command path, which reads its command lines from the same configuration file. As a result, with --disable-config-exec enabled, a configured alert action that contains > (file redirection), && (chaining) or | (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file write / command chaining at the privilege of the glances process when the alert triggers.

Affected code

glances/actions.py (Glances 4.5.5, latest):

ret = secure_popen(cmd_full)        # line 111 — no allow_operators=, defaults to True

By contrast the AMP modules were fixed:

# glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69
self.set_result(secure_popen(res, allow_operators=self.allow_operators()).rstrip())
# glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60
res = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'), allow_operators=self.allow_operators())

PoC (benign)

glances.conf:

[cpu]
user_critical=1
user_critical_action=echo MARKER > /tmp/poc_marker

Run glances --disable-config-exec and generate CPU load. When the cpu user alert reaches CRITICAL, /tmp/poc_marker is created — i.e. the > operator was interpreted despite --disable-config-exec. The same > in an [amp_*] command value is correctly not interpreted.

Impact

Arbitrary file write (>), command chaining (&&) and pipe (|) from config-defined alert actions, contrary to the guarantee of --disable-config-exec. Trust boundary = the glances configuration file.

Suggested fix

Pass allow_operators=not args.disable_config_exec from GlancesActions.run() into secure_popen() (GlancesActions already holds args).

Credit

Reported via responsible-disclosure incomplete-fix measurement study.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIglancesall versions4.5.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for glances. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update glances to 4.5.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-68519 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-68519 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-68519. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary In Glances 4.5.5 the `--disable-config-exec` flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop `secure_popen()` from interpreting the shell operators `&&`, `|` and `>` in **AMP** command values taken from the configuration file. The hardening was not applied to the **on-alert action** command path, which reads its command lines from the same configuration file. As a result, with `--disable-config-exec` enabled, a configured alert action that contains `>` (file redirection), `&&` (chaining) or `|` (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file write / command cha
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-68519 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-68519 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.