github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFeeGHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc is a security vulnerability in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
Impact
If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.
Details
The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.
That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.
Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.
Patches
The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.
The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.
The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.
Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.
Workarounds
There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)
References
SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk for GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.