How severe is GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc?

GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc affects the following packages: github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc?

No patched version of github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk has shipped for GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

How do I detect GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc was published on June 30, 2023 and was last updated on November 8, 2023. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc

github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

Also known asGO-2023-1881

Published

Jun 30, 2023

Updated

Nov 8, 2023

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

None yet

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

Impact

If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.

That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.

Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.

Patches

The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706

Affected Packages

1 total

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk`	all versions	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk has shipped for GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee ### Impact If a transaction is sent to the `x/crisis` module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the `x/crisis` module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK. ### Details The `x/crisis` module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a `MsgVerifyInvariant` with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a `ConstantFee` was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works