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GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm

ASA-2024-0012, ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow or resource exhaustion

Also known asGO-2024-3339
Published
Dec 16, 2024
Updated
Dec 23, 2024
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk🐹github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk🐹cosmossdk.io/x/tx

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

ASA-2024-0012

Name: ASA-2024-0012, Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2) Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14 Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators

ASA-2024-0013

Name: ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in resource exhaustion
Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2) Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14 Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators

Impact

ASA-2024-0012

When decoding a maliciously formed packet with a deeply-nested structure, it may be possible for a stack overflow to occur and result in a network halt. This was addressed by adding a recursion limit while decoding the packet.

ASA-2024-0013

Nested messages in a transaction can consume exponential cpu and memory on UnpackAny calls. Themax_tx_bytes sets a limit for external TX but is not applied for internal messages emitted by wasm contracts or a malicious validator block. This may result in a node crashing due to resource exhaustion. This was addressed by adding additional validation to prevent this condition.

Patches

The issues above are resolved in Cosmos SDK versions v0.47.15 or v0.50.11. Please upgrade ASAP.

Timeline for ASA-2024-0012

  • October 1, 2024, 12:29pm UTC: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program
  • October 1, 2024, 2:47pm UTC: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team
  • December 9, 2024, 11:13am UTC: Core team completes patch for issue
  • Dec 14, 2024,16:00 UTC: Pre-notification delivered
  • Dec 16, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Patch made available

This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 1, 2024.

Timeline for ASA-2024-0013

  • October 19, 2024, 8:12pm UTC: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program
  • October 19, 2024, 8:28pm UTC: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team
  • December 11, 2024, 3:31pm UTC: Core team completes patch for issue
  • Dec 14, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Pre-notification delivered
  • Dec 16, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Patch made available

This issue was reported by LonelySloth to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 19, 2024.

If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [email protected]. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk≥ 0.50.0-alpha.0&&< 0.50.110.50.11
🐹Gogithub.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkall versions0.47.15
🐹Gocosmossdk.io/x/txall versions0.13.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk to 0.50.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary ### ASA-2024-0012 Name: ASA-2024-0012, Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14 Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators ### ASA-2024-0013 Name: ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in resource exhaustion Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact,
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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