ASA-2024-003: Missing `BlockedAddressed` Validation in Vesting ModuleGHSA-4j93-fm92-rp4m
MEDIUMFix: cosmos/cosmos-sdk@c058502GHSA-4j93-fm92-rp4m is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. A fix is available for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk🐹github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
ASA-2024-003: Missing BlockedAddressed Validation in Vesting Module
Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: Low Affected Versions: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 Affected Users: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators Impact: Denial of Service
Description
A vulnerability was identified in the x/auth/vesting module, which can allow a user to create a periodic vesting account on a blocked address, for example a non-initialized module account. Additional validation was added to prevent creation of a periodic vesting account in this scenario.
If this case is triggered, there is the potential for a chain halt if the uninitialized account in question is called by GetModuleAccount in Begin/EndBlock of a module. This combination of an uninitialized blocked module account is not common.
Next Steps for Impacted Parties
If your chain has uninitialized blocked module accounts, it is recommended to proactively initialize them, as they are often initialized during a chain migration or during init genesis.
If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade.
A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK repository. For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/.
This issue was found by Dongsam who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 30, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.
Addendum
A variant trigger of this issue via the x/authz and x/feegrant modules was discovered by Richie who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on April 6th, 2024, and was subsequently fixed by the Cosmos SDK team on April 21st, 2024. The guidance for mitigating this additional variant is the same as the parent advisory, so it is suggested that all chains proactively initialize module accounts if they have not already done so.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk | ≥ 0.50.0&&< 0.50.4 | 0.50.4go get github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk@v0.50.4 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk | all versions | 0.47.9go get github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk@v0.47.9 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk to 0.50.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4j93-fm92-rp4m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4j93-fm92-rp4m in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.