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HIGH severity

cosign's `cosign verify-attestaton --type` can report a false positive if any attestation existsGHSA-vjxv-45g9-9296

HIGHFix: sigstore/cosign@c5fda01

GHSA-vjxv-45g9-9296 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-347 vulnerability in github.com/sigstore/cosign. 2 public exploit or proof-of-concept references are indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/sigstore/cosign — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asBIT-cosign-2022-35929CVE-2022-35929GO-2022-0758
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
2 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vjxv-45g9-9296.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs53th percentile — riskier than 53% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.39%0.79%1.18%0.2%0.7%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/sigstore/cosign

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

cosign is a container signing and verification utility. In versions prior to 1.10.1 cosign can report a false positive if any attestation exists. cosign verify-attestation used with the --type flag will report a false positive verification when there is at least one attestation with a valid signature and there are NO attestations of the type being verified (--type defaults to "custom"). This can happen when signing with a standard keypair and with "keyless" signing with Fulcio. This vulnerability can be reproduced with the distroless.dev/static@sha256:dd7614b5a12bc4d617b223c588b4e0c833402b8f4991fb5702ea83afad1986e2 image. This image has a vuln attestation but not an spdx attestation. However, if you run cosign verify-attestation --type=spdx on this image, it incorrectly succeeds. This issue has been addressed in version 1.10.1 of cosign. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosignall versions1.10.1go get github.com/sigstore/cosign@v1.10.1

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
cosignsigstore
< 1.10.1
range
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/cosign, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/sigstore/cosign to 1.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vjxv-45g9-9296 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

`cosign verify-attestation` used with the `--type` flag will report a false positive verification when: - There is at least one attestation with a valid signature - There are NO attestations of the type being verified (--type defaults to "custom") This can happen when signing with a standard keypair and with "keyless" signing with Fulcio. Users should upgrade to cosign version 1.10.1 or greater for a patch. Currently the only workaround is to upgrade.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-vjxv-45g9-9296: cosign — Fixed in 1.10.1