CVE-2024-29903 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.2) CWE-770 vulnerability in github.com/sigstore/cosign. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/sigstore/cosign — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Cosign vulnerable to machine-wide denial of service via malicious artifacts
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-29903.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/sigstore/cosign🐹github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Maliciously-crafted software artifacts can cause denial of service of the machine running Cosign, thereby impacting all services on the machine. The root cause is that Cosign creates slices based on the number of signatures, manifests or attestations in untrusted artifacts. As such, the untrusted artifact can control the amount of memory that Cosign allocates.
As an example, these lines demonstrate the problem:
This Get() method gets the manifest of the image, allocates a slice equal to the length of the layers in the manifest, loops through the layers and adds a new signature to the slice.
The exact issue is Cosign allocates excessive memory on the lines that creates a slice of the same length as the manifests.
Remediation
Update to the latest version of Cosign, where the number of attestations, signatures and manifests has been limited to a reasonable value.
Cosign PoC
In the case of this API (also referenced above):
… The first line can contain a length that is safe for the system and will not throw a runtime panic or be blocked by other safety mechanisms. For the sake of argument, let’s say that the length of m, err := s.Manifest() is the max allowed (by the machine without throwing OOM panics) manifests minus 1. When Cosign then allocates a new slice on this line: signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(m.Layers)), Cosign will allocate more memory than is available and the machine will be denied of service, causing Cosign and all other services on the machine to be unavailable.
To illustrate the issue here, we run a modified version of TestSignedImageIndex() in pkg/oci/remote:
Here, wantLayers is the number of manifests from these lines:
To test this, we want to make wantLayers high enough to not cause a memory on its own but still trigger the machine-wide OOM when a slice gets create with the same length. On my local machine, it would take hours to create a slice of layers that fulfils that criteria, so instead I modify the Cosign production code to reflect a long list of manifests:
// Get implements oci.Signatures
func (s *sigs) Get() ([]oci.Signature, error) {
m, err := s.Manifest()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Here we imitate a long list of manifests
ms := make([]byte, 2600000000) // imitate a long list of manifests
signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(ms))
panic("Done")
//signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(m.Layers))
for _, desc := range m.Layers {
With this modified code, if we can cause an OOM without triggering the panic("Done"), we have succeeded.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/cosign | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 | all versions | 2.2.4go get github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2@v2.2.4 |
Affected Products
cosignsigstoreResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/cosign, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
A fix is available for CVE-2024-29903; check the affected-versions list above or the advisory for the patched release of github.com/sigstore/cosign, then make sure no transitive dependency still pins the vulnerable range.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability results only in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) against the Cosign service. Additionally, exploitation requires that the service is configured to accept artifacts from untrusted sources. Consequently, Red Hat's assessment indicates the security impact of this vulnerability is Moderate.
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| OpenShift-Pipelines-1.15-RHEL-8 | openshift-pipelines-client-0:1.15.0-11496.el8 | RHEA-2024:4022 |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security 4.5 | advanced-cluster-security/rhacs-central-db-rhel8:4.5.0-2 | RHSA-2024:4836 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-29903 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.