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CVE-2023-46737

LOW

Possible endless data attack from attacker-controlled registry in cosign

Also known asBIT-cosign-2023-46737GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9GO-2023-2181
Published
Nov 7, 2023
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk46th percentile+0.33%
0.00%0.38%0.76%1.14%0.3%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/sigstore/cosign🐹github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Cosign is a sigstore signing tool for OCI containers. Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry or make a request to a registry they control. When doing so, the attacker must return a high number of attestations in the response to Cosign. The result will be that the attacker can cause Cosign to go into a long or infinite loop that will prevent other users from verifying their data. In Kyvernos case, an attacker whose privileges are limited to making requests to the cluster can make a request with an image reference to their own registry, trigger the infinite loop and deny other users from completing their admission requests. Alternatively, the attacker can obtain control of the registry used by an organization and return a high number of attestations instead the expected number of attestations. The issue can be mitigated rather simply by setting a limit to the limit of attestations that Cosign will loop through. The limit does not need to be high to be within the vast majority of use cases and still prevent the endless data attack. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.1 and users are advised to upgrade.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosignall versions1.13.2
🐹Gogithub.com/sigstore/cosign/v2all versions2.2.1
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/cosign. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/sigstore/cosign to 1.13.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-46737 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2023-46737 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2023-46737. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Cosign is a sigstore signing tool for OCI containers. Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry or make a request to a registry they control. When doing so, the attacker must return a high number of at
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-46737 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2023-46737 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.