CVE-2026-39395 — cosign
MEDIUMCVE-2026-39395 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-754 vulnerability in github.com/sigstore/cosign. A fix is available for github.com/sigstore/cosign — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Cosign's verify-blob-attestation reports false positive when payload parsing fails
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-39395.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-39395 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/sigstore/cosign🐹github.com/sigstore/cosignReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
cosign verify-blob-attestation may erroneously report a "Verified OK" result for attestations with malformed payloads or mismatched predicate types. For old-format bundles and detached signatures, this was due to a logic flaw in the error handling of the predicate type validation. For new-format bundles, the predicate type validation was bypassed completely.
Impact
When cosign verify-blob-attestation is used without --check-claims set to true, an attestation that has a valid signature but a malformed or unparsable payload would be incorrectly validated. Additionally, systems relying on --type <predicate type> to reject attestations with mismatched types would be lead to trust the unexpected attestation type.
Patches
v3.0.6, v2.6.3
Workarounds
Always set --check-claims=true for attestation verification.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/cosign | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.0.6 | 3.0.6go get github.com/sigstore/cosign@v3.0.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/cosign | all versions | 2.6.3go get github.com/sigstore/cosign@v2.6.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/cosign, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/sigstore/cosign to 3.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-39395 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-39395 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-39395. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-39395 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-39395 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.