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Not in CISA KEV

Ruby SAML DOS vulnerability with large SAML responseGHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966

Fix: SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml#770

GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966 is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ruby-saml. A fix is available for ruby-saml — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-54572
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs40th percentile — riskier than 40% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.36%0.72%1.08%0.6%0.5%Jun 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💎ruby-saml

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion.

Details

ruby-saml includes a message_max_bytesize setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code:

https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb

      def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
        return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # <--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block.

        settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
        if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
          raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
        end

        decoded = decode(saml)
        ...
      end

The vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the base64_encoded? function performs regex matching on the entire input string:

!!string.gsub(/[\r\n]|\\r|\\n|\s/, "").match(BASE64_FORMAT)

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

When successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to:

  • Excessive memory consumption
  • High CPU utilization
  • Application slowdown or unresponsiveness
  • Complete application crash in severe cases
  • Potential denial of service for legitimate users

All applications using ruby-saml with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable.

Potential Solution

Reorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first

def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)
  settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?

  if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
    raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
  end
  
  return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml)
  decoded = decode(saml)
  ...
end

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsruby-samlall versions1.18.1bundle update ruby-saml --conservative

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ruby-saml, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update ruby-saml to 1.18.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion. ### Details `ruby-saml` includes a `message_max_bytesize` setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code: https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/one
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Ruby SAML DOS vulnerability with large SAML response