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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj fast-xml-parser

HIGHFix: NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser@910dae5

GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-776 vulnerability in fast-xml-parser. A fix is available for fast-xml-parser — see the affected versions and patch details below.

fast-xml-parser affected by DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (no expansion limit)

Also known asCVE-2026-26278
Published
Feb 17, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs57th percentile — riskier than 57% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

5Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
fast-xml-parsernpm
57.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application.

Details

There is a check in DocTypeReader.js that tries to prevent entity expansion attacks by rejecting entities that reference other entities (it looks for & inside entity values). This does stop classic “Billion Laughs” payloads.

However, it doesn’t stop a much simpler variant.

If you define one large entity that contains only raw text (no & characters) and then reference it many times, the parser will happily expand it every time. There is no limit on how large the expanded result can become, or how many replacements are allowed.

The problem is in replaceEntitiesValue() inside OrderedObjParser.js. It repeatedly runs val.replace() in a loop, without any checks on total output size or execution cost. As the entity grows or the number of references increases, parsing time explodes.

Relevant code:

DocTypeReader.js (lines 28–33): entity registration only checks for &

OrderedObjParser.js (lines 439–458): entity replacement loop with no limits

PoC

const { XMLParser } = require('fast-xml-parser');

const entity = 'A'.repeat(1000);
const refs = '&big;'.repeat(100);
const xml = `<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY big "${entity}">]><root>${refs}</root>`;

console.time('parse');
new XMLParser().parse(xml); // ~4–8 seconds for ~1.3 KB of XML
console.timeEnd('parse');

// 5,000 chars × 100 refs takes 200+ seconds
// 50,000 chars × 1,000 refs will hang indefinitely

Impact

This is a straightforward denial-of-service issue.

Any service that parses user-supplied XML using the default configuration is vulnerable. Since Node.js runs on a single thread, the moment the parser starts expanding entities, the event loop is blocked. While this is happening, the server can’t handle any other requests.

In testing, a payload of only a few kilobytes was enough to make a simple HTTP server completely unresponsive for several minutes, with all other requests timing out.

Workaround

Avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by processEntities: false option.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmfast-xml-parser4.1.3&&< 4.5.44.5.4npm install fast-xml-parser@4.5.4
📦npmfast-xml-parser5.0.0&&< 5.3.65.3.6npm install fast-xml-parser@5.3.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fast-xml-parser, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update fast-xml-parser to 4.5.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security 4.8advanced-cluster-security/rhacs-main-rhel8:1775594119RHSA-2026:7110
Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security 4.9advanced-cluster-security/rhacs-main-rhel8:1775594284RHSA-2026:7128
Red Hat Developer Hub 1.8rhdh/rhdh-hub-rhel9:1774545605RHSA-2026:6174
Red Hat Developer Hub 1.9rhdh/rhdh-hub-rhel9:1775140647RHSA-2026:6802
Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.18odf4/cephcsi-rhel9:1783676191RHSA-2026:41941
Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.19odf4/cephcsi-rhel9:1783684360RHSA-2026:41944
Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.20odf4/cephcsi-rhel9:1783667125RHSA-2026:40984
Red Hat Satellite 6.18satellite/iop-host-inventory-frontend-rhel9:1785922764RHSA-2026:51349

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. ### Details There is a check in `DocTypeReader.js` that tries to prevent entity expansion attacks by rejecting entities that reference other entities (it looks for & inside entity values). This does stop classic “Billion Laughs” payloads. However, it doesn’t stop a much simpler variant. If you define one large entity that contains only raw text (no
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj: fast-xml (High 7.5) | O3 Security