GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw
MEDIUMGHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in guzzlehttp/psr7. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
guzzlehttp/psr7 has CRLF Injection via URI Host Component
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 371,256 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
guzzlehttp/psr7Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
guzzlehttp/psr7 did not reject ASCII control characters, whitespace, or DEL in first-party URI host components. The issue requires a PSR-7 request to be serialized into a raw HTTP/1.x message, for example with GuzzleHttp\Psr7\Message::toString() or an equivalent custom serializer. Creating a Uri, Request, or other PSR-7 object alone is not sufficient. The malformed host must be copied into the serialized Host header without further validation.
A vulnerable flow is:
- An application accepts a user-controlled URL.
- The URL is used to construct a PSR-7
UriorRequest. - The host component contains CRLF or another header-unsafe character.
- The request is serialized into a raw HTTP/1.x message without an explicit
Hostheader. - The host is copied into the serialized
Hostheader. - The serialized request is written to the network or otherwise processed by software that does not independently reject the malformed host.
In that flow, an attacker can cause the serialized request to contain additional attacker-controlled header lines. For example, a host containing "\r\nX-Injected: yes" can cause the generated Host header to span multiple HTTP header lines.
This is not the normal request-sending path used by guzzlehttp/guzzle. Applications using guzzlehttp/psr7 only through Guzzle's standard HTTP client APIs are not expected to be affected. Applications are most likely to be affected when they manually serialize PSR-7 requests, forward raw HTTP messages, or use custom transports, proxying, crawling, webhook delivery, or similar request-dispatch code that serializes requests without independently validating URI hosts and header data. In deployments involving HTTP/1.1 connection reuse, proxies, gateways, or load balancers, this malformed serialized request may also contribute to request smuggling or cache poisoning, depending on how downstream components parse the request.
Patches
The issue is patched in 2.10.2 and later. 1.x is end-of-life and will not receive a patch.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, validate and reject all untrusted URI strings before constructing PSR-7 Uri or Request instances. Reject input containing ASCII control characters, whitespace, or DEL, including CRLF, tab, space, NUL, or DEL characters:
if (preg_match('/[\x00-\x20\x7F]/', $untrustedUrl)) {
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Insecure URL detected');
}
Applications that manually serialize or forward requests should also ensure the final HTTP client, transport, or serializer rejects invalid URI and header data before writing requests to the network.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | guzzlehttp/psr7 | all versions | 2.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for guzzlehttp/psr7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update guzzlehttp/psr7 to 2.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-hq7v-mx3g-29hw across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.