GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2
MEDIUMSurrealDB vulnerable to Improper Authentication when Changing Databases as Scope User
Blast Radius
surrealdb🦀surrealdb🦀surrealdb-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Authentication would not be properly validated when an already authenticated scope user would use the use method or USE clause to switch working databases in a session. If there was a user record in the new database with identical record identifier as the original record that the user authenticated with in the original database, this could result in the user being able to perform actions under the identity of the unrelated user in the new database. This issue does not affect system users at any level.
By default, record identifiers are randomly generated with sufficient complexity to prevent the identifier collision required to trigger this issue. However, the issue may trigger in situations where multiple databases in the same SurrealDB instance are using explicitly defined or incremental record identifiers to identify users on an identically named table.
Impact
Under the circumstances described above, a user who has an authenticated session as a scope user in a database could become authorized to query data under the identity of a specific scope user associated with an identical record identifier in a different database within the same SurrealDB instace if the PERMISSIONS clause would allow it due to relying exclusively on the $auth parameter, which would point to the impersonated user. The impact is limited to the single user with matching record identifier.
The impact of this issue is mitigated if the table PERMISSIONS clause explicitly checks for an scope that only exists in the specific database (e.g. $scope = "production") or certain claims of the authentication token (e.g. $token.email = "[email protected]"), both of which would remain unchanged in the session of the authenticated user after changing databases. Permissions will default to NONE if there is no PERMISSIONS clause, which also mitigates this impact of this issue.
Patches
- Version 1.5.4 and later are not affected by this issue.
- Version 2.0.0-alpha.6 and later will not be affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Users unable to update may want to ensure that table PERMISSIONS clauses explicitly check that the $scope parameter matches a scope that is uniquely named across databases in the same SurrealDB instance. Ensuring that record identifiers for users are automatically generated or explicitly generated to be unique across databases may also be sufficient to mitigate this issue, as the $auth parameter will not link to any user record and any PERMISSIONS clauses restricting authorization based on the authenticated user should fail to successfully evaluate.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | all versions | 1.5.4 |
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | ≥ 2.0.0-alpha.1&&< 2.0.0-alpha.6 | 2.0.0-alpha.6 |
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb-core | all versions | 1.5.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update surrealdb to 1.5.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-gh9f-6xm2-c4j2 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.