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MEDIUM severity

SurrealDB vulnerable to pre-auth memory amplification via unbounded `/sql` WebSocket framesGHSA-65rj-r9fh-jp2v

MEDIUMFix: surrealdb/surrealdb@899967e

GHSA-65rj-r9fh-jp2v is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in surrealdb. A fix is available for surrealdb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀surrealdb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

An anonymous caller could degrade /sql availability by streaming WebSocket frames many times larger than the operator-configured per-connection limit. The /sql upgrade handler accepted anonymous connections and did not propagate SURREAL_WEBSOCKET_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE to the WebSocket protocol layer — incoming bytes accumulated in the per-connection read buffer before check_anon could reject the query, so the memory cost was incurred regardless of whether the caller could ever execute SurrealQL. The same upgrade path also silently ignored --deny-http sql and --deny-arbitrary-query * for authenticated callers, but that secondary effect does not grant new permissions.

Impact

SURREAL_WEBSOCKET_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE is not applied to anonymous /sql connections, so each connection can buffer up to the WebSocket library defaults (16 MiB per frame, 64 MiB per reassembled message) of in-flight bytes regardless of the operator's configured limit. Holding this much memory pinned requires actively streaming bytes into the connection, so an attacker has to maintain bandwidth across many concurrent connections to consume meaningful memory. Within that constraint the result is degraded availability for legitimate /sql clients; on memory-constrained deployments the process may be OOM-killed and restarted during the attack rather than denied service outright.

Separately, --deny-http sql and --deny-arbitrary-query * were not enforced on the WebSocket, so SurrealQL operations the operator had configured to refuse could still be issued by any authenticated principal that already held the corresponding data permissions. This is a configuration-correctness defect — the bypass does not grant new permissions.

Patches

A patch has been introduced that performs the two capability checks before calling on_upgrade and applies the same per-connection size limits used by /rpc. The capability checks enforce the operator's configured deny flags; they do not change what any authenticated principal is permitted to do.

  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Affected users who are unable to update should refuse GET /sql requests carrying Upgrade: websocket at a reverse proxy, or apply per-connection frame size limits at the reverse proxy.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosurrealdball versions3.1.0cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update surrealdb to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-65rj-r9fh-jp2v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

An anonymous caller could degrade `/sql` availability by streaming WebSocket frames many times larger than the operator-configured per-connection limit. The `/sql` upgrade handler accepted anonymous connections and did not propagate `SURREAL_WEBSOCKET_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE` to the WebSocket protocol layer — incoming bytes accumulated in the per-connection read buffer before `check_anon` could reject the query, so the memory cost was incurred regardless of whether the caller could ever execute SurrealQL. The same upgrade path also silently ignored `--deny-http sql` and `--deny-arbitrary-query *` for
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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SurrealDB vulnerable to pre-auth memory amplification…