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GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9

MEDIUM

SurrealDB: Crafting malicious LIVE queries writes to the database, resulting in DoS, without permission to the table required

Published
Jul 1, 2026
Updated
Jul 1, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀surrealdb

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Description

A LIVE query whose WHERE clause evaluates to an error caused the source data modifier (the user creating, updating, or deleting a record on the watched table) to fail instead. Calling any arbitrary SurrealQL function with a typed parameter and passing a value of the wrong type — for example LIVE SELECT * FROM t WHERE string::trim(deny) — triggered an evaluation error inside the LIVE notification path. That error then propagated through to the triggering write, rolling back the attempted change.

While such a LIVE query was registered, all CREATE, UPDATE, and DELETE operations on the watched table failed — including those issued by a root user — for as long as the registration remained active. Registering the LIVE required select permission on the table; no other permission on the table was needed.

Impact

An authenticated user with select permission on a table can prevent all CREATE, UPDATE, and DELETE operations on that table — by any other user, up to and including root — for the lifetime of a single registered LIVE query. Service is restored when the LIVE query is killed or the session that registered it ends.

Patches

A patch has been introduced that:

  1. Decouples LIVE query evaluation errors from the source transaction — when lq_check returns an error during the LIVE notification path, the error is now reported to the LIVE subscriber as an Action::Error notification and the LIVE processing path returns Ok(()). The triggering write proceeds normally.
  2. Defers the error notification until after the permission check — the Action::Error notification is only delivered after the LIVE subscription's PERMISSIONS clause has been evaluated, so unauthorised subscribers do not learn even that an error occurred (closing an information-disclosure side channel introduced by the first part of the fix).
  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Users unable to upgrade should restrict the ability of untrusted users to register LIVE queries by removing the select permission on tables they want to keep writeable, or by gating LIVE registration at the application layer.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosurrealdball versions3.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update surrealdb to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

A `LIVE` query whose `WHERE` clause evaluates to an error caused the source data modifier (the user creating, updating, or deleting a record on the watched table) to fail instead. Calling any arbitrary SurrealQL function with a typed parameter and passing a value of the wrong type — for example `LIVE SELECT * FROM t WHERE string::trim(deny)` — triggered an evaluation error inside the LIVE notification path. That error then propagated through to the triggering write, rolling back the attempted change. While such a `LIVE` query was registered, all `CREATE`, `UPDATE`, and `DELETE` operations on
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-4v76-cw68-4vc9 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.