GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf
MEDIUMSurrealDB has an Authorization Bypass via Composite Record-id Paths
Blast Radius
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Description
An authenticated user could bypass permission rules that gated access on parts of a record's id — most commonly tenant-isolation rules of the form PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE id.tenant = $auth.id.tenant. The same defect also let UNIQUE constraints defined on parts of an id admit duplicate entries.
When a query referenced part of a composite record id (id.tenant, id.uid, …), SurrealDB read the value from the record's editable body fields instead of from the immutable id key. Because the body is editable but the id is fixed at creation, an attacker with write access could set the body field to any value and have permission checks read that spoofed value.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- Read records hidden by permission rules of the form
id.<field> = $auth.<...>(typically tenant- or scope-isolation boundaries) by writing the same-named field on a record they control to the spoofed value. - Cause UNIQUE constraints defined on
id.<field>to silently admit duplicate entries, leaving the database with rows that violate the constraint.
What it can't do:
- Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.
-Bypass field-level
PERMISSIONS FORupdate clauses that don't referenceid.<field>paths. - Affect availability or crash the server.
Patches
The value-path resolver now special-cases Part::Field and Part::Value against RecordIdKey::Object, reading the named component directly from the id key without ever entering select_document. The Array-keyed special case (id[0], id[1], …) is unchanged.
- Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:
- Avoid permission expressions that read
id.<field>on Object-keyed record ids; gate on the full record id (id = $auth.id) or on a server-derived session value instead. - Avoid UNIQUE indexes on
id.<field>until 3.1.0; useDEFINE INDEX ... ON FIELDS id UNIQUE(the full id) where possible.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | all versions | 3.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update surrealdb to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.