GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr
HIGHUntrusted Query Object Evaluation in RPC API
Blast Radius
surrealdb🦀surrealdb-core🦀surrealdbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
During the sign in and sign up operations through the SurrealDB RPC API, an arbitrary object would be accepted in order to support a wide array of types and structures that could contain user credentials. This arbitrary object could potentially contain any SurrealDB value, including an object representing a subquery. For this to materialize, this object would need to be encoded using the bincode serialization format instead of the default JSON serialization format or the additionally supported CBOR serialization format.
If a binary object containing a subquery were to be provided in this way, that subquery would be computed while executing the SIGNIN and SIGNUP queries defined by the database owner while defining a record access method. Since those queries are executed under a system user session with the editor role, an unauthenticated attacker may be able to leverage this behavior to select, create, update and delete non-IAM resources with permissions of a system user with the editor role.
Impact
If a record access method was defined with a SIGNIN or a SIGNUP query and the SurrealDB RPC API was exposed to untrusted users, an attacker could be able to craft a binary object containing a subquery to provide in place of valid credentials when calling the signin and signup operations via the RPC API with the bincode serialization format. The attacker could use that subquery to select, create, update and delete resources in SurrealDB, but they would not be able to directly view the results of the query. This method cannot be used to create, update or delete IAM resources, as access to those kind of resources requires the owner role.
Patches
Objects provided as variables to the sign in and sign up methods are now recursively validated to ensure that they do not contain any non-computed values, which include subqueries and other data types that could potentially result in query execution.
- Version 1.5.5 and later are not affected by this issue.
- Version 2.0.0-beta.3 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Users unable to update may want to disallow access to the SurrealDB RPC API using the affected binary serialization formats by conservatively allowing only requests to the /rpc endpoint of the SurrealDB HTTP server with the application/json content type. If the RPC API is not used at all or only used by trusted clients, disallowing or restricting access to the /rpc endpoint of the SurrealDB HTTP server will also prevent exploitation. Alternatively, if filtering HTTP requests is not possible, record access methods that define SIGNIN and SIGNUP clauses may be temporarily removed to completely prevent potential attacks leveraging this issue.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | all versions | 1.5.5 |
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb-core | all versions | 1.5.2 |
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | ≥ 2.0.0-beta.1&&< 2.0.0-beta.3 | 2.0.0-beta.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update surrealdb to 1.5.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-64f8-pjgr-9wmr across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.