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GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943

MEDIUM

Envoy affected by off-by-one write in JsonEscaper::escapeString()

Also known asBIT-envoy-2026-26309CVE-2026-26309
Published
Mar 10, 2026
Updated
Mar 13, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk28th percentile+0.36%
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.86%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An off-by-one write in Envoy::JsonEscaper::escapeString() can corrupt std::string null-termination, causing undefined behavior and potentially leading to crashes or out-of-bounds reads when the resulting string is later treated as a C-string.

Details

The bug is in the control-character escaping path in source/common/common/ json_escape_string.h:67.

  • The function pre-sizes result to the final length: std::string result(input.size() + required_size, '\');
  • For control characters (0x00..0x1f), it emits a JSON escape sequence of length 6: \u00XX.
  • It uses sprintf(&result[position + 1], "u%04x", ...), which writes 5 chars + a trailing NUL (\0) starting at result[position + 1].
  • Then it does position += 6; and writes result[position] = '\'; to overwrite the NUL.
  • If the control character occurs at the end of the output (e.g., the input ends with \x01), then after position += 6, position == result.size(), so result[position] is one past the end (off-by-one), violating std::string bounds/contract.

Concretely, the problematic lines are:

  • source/common/common/json_escape_string.h:69 (sprintf(...))
  • source/common/common/json_escape_string.h:72 (result[position] = '\';)

Potentially reachable from request-driven paths that escape untrusted data, e.g. invalid header reporting:

  • source/common/http/header_utility.cc:538 ~ source/common/http/ header_utility.cc:546 (escapes invalid header key for error text)

Even when this doesn’t immediately crash, it can break the std::string requirement that c_str()[size()] == '\0', which can later trigger UB (e.g., if passed to strlen, printf("%s"), or any C API that expects NUL termination).

//clang++ -std=c++20 -O0 -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer
repro_json_escape_asan.cc -o repro_json_escape_asan
ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1 ./repro_json_escape_asan
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstdio>
#include <cstring>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>

static uint64_t extraSpace(std::string_view input) {
  uint64_t result = 0;
  for (unsigned char c : input) {
    switch (c) {
    case '\"':
    case '\\':
    case '\b':
    case '\f':
    case '\n':
    case '\r':
    case '\t':
      result += 1;
      break;
    default:
      if (c == 0x00 || (c > 0x00 && c <= 0x1f)) {
        result += 5;
      }
      break;
    }
  }
  return result;
}

static std::string escapeString(std::string_view input, uint64_t
required_size) {
  std::string result(input.size() + required_size, '\\');
  uint64_t position = 0;

  for (unsigned char character : input) {
    switch (character) {
    case '\"':
      result[position + 1] = '\"';
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\\':
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\b':
      result[position + 1] = 'b';
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\f':
      result[position + 1] = 'f';
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\n':
      result[position + 1] = 'n';
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\r':
      result[position + 1] = 'r';
      position += 2;
      break;
    case '\t':
      result[position + 1] = 't';
      position += 2;
      break;
    default:
      if (character == 0x00 || (character > 0x00 && character <= 0x1f)) {
        std::sprintf(&result[position + 1], "u%04x",
static_cast<int>(character));
        position += 6;
        // Off-by-one when this escape is the last output chunk:
        // position can become result.size(), so result[position] is out of
bounds.
        result[position] = '\\';
      } else {
        result[position++] = static_cast<char>(character);
      }
      break;
    }
  }

  return result;
}

int main() {
  std::string input(4096, 'A');
  input.push_back('\x01'); // ends with a control char -> triggers the buggy
path at the end

  const uint64_t required = extraSpace(input);
  std::string escaped = escapeString(input, required);

  std::printf("escaped.size=%zu\n", escaped.size());
  unsigned char terminator = static_cast<unsigned char>(escaped.c_str()
[escaped.size()]);
  std::printf("escaped.c_str()[escaped.size()] = 0x%02x\n", terminator);

  // If NUL termination is corrupted, this can read past the logical end.
  std::printf("strlen(escaped.c_str()) = %zu\n",
std::strlen(escaped.c_str()));
  return 0;
}```

Affected Packages

4 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/envoyall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/envoy1.36.0No fix
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/envoy1.35.0No fix
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/envoyall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/envoy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/envoyproxy/envoy has shipped for GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An off-by-one write in Envoy::JsonEscaper::escapeString() can corrupt std::string null-termination, causing undefined behavior and potentially leading to crashes or out-of-bounds reads when the resulting string is later treated as a C-string. ### Details The bug is in the control-character escaping path in source/common/common/ json_escape_string.h:67. - The function pre-sizes result to the final length: std::string result(input.size() + required_size, '\\'); - For control characters (0x00..0x1f), it emits a JSON escape sequence of length 6: \u00XX.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-56cj-wgg3-x943 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.