CVE-2026-26309 — envoy
MEDIUMCVE-2026-26309 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-193 vulnerability in github.com/envoyproxy/envoy. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Envoy has an off-by-one write in JsonEscaper::escapeString()
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-26309.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-26309 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoy🐹github.com/envoyproxy/envoyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An off-by-one write in Envoy::JsonEscaper::escapeString() can corrupt std::string null-termination, causing undefined behavior and potentially leading to crashes or out-of-bounds reads when the resulting string is later treated as a C-string.
Details
The bug is in the control-character escaping path in source/common/common/ json_escape_string.h:67.
- The function pre-sizes result to the final length: std::string result(input.size() + required_size, '\');
- For control characters (0x00..0x1f), it emits a JSON escape sequence of length 6: \u00XX.
- It uses sprintf(&result[position + 1], "u%04x", ...), which writes 5 chars + a trailing NUL (\0) starting at result[position + 1].
- Then it does position += 6; and writes result[position] = '\'; to overwrite the NUL.
- If the control character occurs at the end of the output (e.g., the input ends with \x01), then after position += 6, position == result.size(), so result[position] is one past the end (off-by-one), violating std::string bounds/contract.
Concretely, the problematic lines are:
- source/common/common/json_escape_string.h:69 (sprintf(...))
- source/common/common/json_escape_string.h:72 (result[position] = '\';)
Potentially reachable from request-driven paths that escape untrusted data, e.g. invalid header reporting:
- source/common/http/header_utility.cc:538 ~ source/common/http/ header_utility.cc:546 (escapes invalid header key for error text)
Even when this doesn’t immediately crash, it can break the std::string requirement that c_str()[size()] == '\0', which can later trigger UB (e.g., if passed to strlen, printf("%s"), or any C API that expects NUL termination).
//clang++ -std=c++20 -O0 -g -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer
repro_json_escape_asan.cc -o repro_json_escape_asan
ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1 ./repro_json_escape_asan
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstdio>
#include <cstring>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
static uint64_t extraSpace(std::string_view input) {
uint64_t result = 0;
for (unsigned char c : input) {
switch (c) {
case '\"':
case '\\':
case '\b':
case '\f':
case '\n':
case '\r':
case '\t':
result += 1;
break;
default:
if (c == 0x00 || (c > 0x00 && c <= 0x1f)) {
result += 5;
}
break;
}
}
return result;
}
static std::string escapeString(std::string_view input, uint64_t
required_size) {
std::string result(input.size() + required_size, '\\');
uint64_t position = 0;
for (unsigned char character : input) {
switch (character) {
case '\"':
result[position + 1] = '\"';
position += 2;
break;
case '\\':
position += 2;
break;
case '\b':
result[position + 1] = 'b';
position += 2;
break;
case '\f':
result[position + 1] = 'f';
position += 2;
break;
case '\n':
result[position + 1] = 'n';
position += 2;
break;
case '\r':
result[position + 1] = 'r';
position += 2;
break;
case '\t':
result[position + 1] = 't';
position += 2;
break;
default:
if (character == 0x00 || (character > 0x00 && character <= 0x1f)) {
std::sprintf(&result[position + 1], "u%04x",
static_cast<int>(character));
position += 6;
// Off-by-one when this escape is the last output chunk:
// position can become result.size(), so result[position] is out of
bounds.
result[position] = '\\';
} else {
result[position++] = static_cast<char>(character);
}
break;
}
}
return result;
}
int main() {
std::string input(4096, 'A');
input.push_back('\x01'); // ends with a control char -> triggers the buggy
path at the end
const uint64_t required = extraSpace(input);
std::string escaped = escapeString(input, required);
std::printf("escaped.size=%zu\n", escaped.size());
unsigned char terminator = static_cast<unsigned char>(escaped.c_str()
[escaped.size()]);
std::printf("escaped.c_str()[escaped.size()] = 0x%02x\n", terminator);
// If NUL termination is corrupted, this can read past the logical end.
std::printf("strlen(escaped.c_str()) = %zu\n",
std::strlen(escaped.c_str()));
return 0;
}```
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/envoyproxy/envoy | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/envoyproxy/envoy | ≥ 1.36.0 | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/envoyproxy/envoy | ≥ 1.35.0 | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/envoyproxy/envoy | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/envoy, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/envoyproxy/envoy has shipped for CVE-2026-26309 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-26309 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-26309. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-26309 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-26309 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.