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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 v7

MEDIUMFix: oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy@780ae4f

GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) Open Redirect vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy

Also known asBIT-oauth2-proxy-2021-21291CVE-2021-21291GO-2022-0790
Published
May 25, 2021
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
1 / 2
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs74th percentile — riskier than 74% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.

For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for .example.com, the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed. Instead, example.com and badexample.com could also match.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.

Original Issue Posted by @semoac:

Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.

Expected Behavior

If whitelist domain is set to .example.com , then hack.alienexample.com should be rejected as a valid redirect.

Current Behavior

The code is removing the dot from .example.com and only checking if the redirect string end with example.com

Possible Solution

Here https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661

Include the dot when checking the string:

strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)

Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)

package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"strings"
)

func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
	if port == "" || port == ":*" {
		return true
	}
	if port[0] != ':' {
		return false
	}
	for _, b := range port[1:] {
		if b < '0' || b > '9' {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
	host = hostport

	colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
	if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
		host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
	}

	if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
		host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
	}

	return
}

func main() {
	domain := ".example.com"
	domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
	redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
	if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}

Users of github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy are advised to update to github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Affected Packages

2 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7all versions7.0.0go get github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7@v7.0.0
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxyall versionsNo fix
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect. For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for `.example.com`, the intention is that subdomains of `example.com` are allowed. Instead, `example.com` and `badexample.com` could also match. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the v
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2: v7 (Medium 5.4) | O3 Security