CVE-2026-41059 — oauth2-proxy
HIGHCVE-2026-41059 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) CWE-288 vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. A fix is available for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41059.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of skip_auth_routes or the legacy skip_auth_regex; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as ^/foo/.*/bar$ causing potential exposure of /foo/secret; and protected upstream applications that interpret # as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form %23, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains %23 or # at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad skip_auth_routes rules.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | ≥ 7.5.0&&< 7.15.2 | 7.15.2go get github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7@v7.15.2 |
Affected Products
oauth2 proxyoauth2_proxy_projectDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.15.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-41059 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This flaw in OAuth2 Proxy allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication. Exploitation requires a specific configuration utilizing `skip_auth_routes` or `skip_auth_regex` with broad wildcard patterns, combined with a backend application that interprets the '#' character as a fragment delimiter. Red Hat…
To mitigate this issue, review and tighten `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` configurations in OAuth2 Proxy, replacing broad wildcard patterns with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods. Additionally, consider implementing ingress, load balancer, or Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to reject requests containing `%23` or '#' in the path. Avoid placing sensitive application paths behind broadly defined `skip_auth_routes` rules. Configuration changes to OAuth2 Proxy may require a service restart to take effect, which could temporarily impact service availability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-41059 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-41059 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.