CVE-2021-21291 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Open Redirect vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.
For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for .example.com, the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed.
Instead, example.com and badexample.com could also match.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
Original Issue Posted by @semoac:
Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.
Expected Behavior
If whitelist domain is set to .example.com , then hack.alienexample.com should be rejected as a valid redirect.
Current Behavior
The code is removing the dot from .example.com and only checking if the redirect string end with example.com
Possible Solution
Include the dot when checking the string:
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)
Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
func main() {
domain := ".example.com"
domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}
Users of github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy are advised to update to github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | all versions | 7.0.0go get github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7@v7.0.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
oauth2 proxyoauth2_proxy_projectResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2021-21291 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop reflecting attacker-controlled destinations: resolve every redirect target against an allowlist of paths or hosts you own, prefer a server-side key over a full URL in the request, and reject absolute URLs entirely where the flow only ever needs a relative one.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2021-21291 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.