GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v
SurrealDB Affected by Confused Deputy Privilege Escalation through Future Fields and Functions
Blast Radius
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Description
Unprivileged users (for example, those with the database editor role) can create or modify fields in records that contain functions or futures. Futures are values which are only computed when the value is queried. The query executes in the context of the querying user, rather than the user who originally defined the future. Likewise, fields containing functions or custom-defined logic (closures) are executed under the privileges of the invoking user, not the creator.
This results in a confused deputy vulnerability: an attacker with limited privileges can define a malicious function or future field that performs privileged actions. When a higher-privileged user (such as a root owner or namespace administrator) executes the function or queries or modifies that record, the function executes with their elevated permissions.
Impact
An attacker who can create or update function/future fields can plant logic that executes with a privileged user’s context. If a privileged user performs a write that touches the malicious field, the attacker can achieve full privilege escalation (e.g., create a root owner and take over the server).
If a privileged user performs a read action on the malicious field, this attack vector could still be potentially be used to perform limited denial of service or, in the specific case where the network capability was explicitly enabled and unrestricted, exfiltrate database information over the network.
Patches
Versions prior to 2.5.0 and 3.0.0-beta.3 are vulnerable.
For SurrealDB 3.0, futures are no longer supported, replaced by computed fields, only available within schemaful tables.
Further to this patches for 2.5.0 and 3.0.0-beta.3:
- Implements an
auth_limiton defined apis, functions, fields and events, that limits execution to the permissions of the creating user or the invoking user, whichever is lower. - Prevents
closuresfrom being stored, that eliminates a potential attack surface. For 2.5.0 this can still be allowed by using theinsecure_storable_closurescapability - Ensures the proper auth level is used to compute expressions in signin & signup
For existing apis, events, fields and functions defined prior to upgrading to 2.5.0 or 3.0.0-beta.3 auth_limit will not apply, to avoid breaking changes. These will need to subsequently be redefined so that auth_limit can take effect.
Workarounds
Users unable to patch are advised to evaluate their use of the database to identify where low privileged users are able to define logic subsequently executed by privileged users, such as apis, functions, futures fields and events, and recommended to minimise these instances.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | all versions | 2.5.0 |
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | ≥ 3.0.0-alpha.1&&< 3.0.0-beta.3 | 3.0.0-beta.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update surrealdb to 2.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-3v2x-9xcv-2v2v across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.