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Not in CISA KEV
LOW severity

GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 contao/contao

LOWFix: contao/contao@5bc6e3f

GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is a low-severity (CVSS 2.6) Information Exposure vulnerability in contao/contao. A fix is available for contao/contao — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Contao crawler leaks auth credentials to external hosts

Also known asCVE-2026-55824
Published
Aug 6, 2026
Updated
Aug 6, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs5th percentile — riskier than 5% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,238 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected
🐘contao/contao🐘contao/contao🐘contao/core-bundle🐘contao/core-bundle

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes Cookie and Authorization headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names basic_auth and bearer_auth instead of Symfony HttpClient's real auth_basic and auth_bearer options.

When contao.crawl.default_http_client_options contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials.

Technical Detail

Root Cause

// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:175-209 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
private function createHttpClient(array $options = []): HttpClientInterface
{
    $options = array_merge_recursive(
        [
            'headers' => [
                'accept' => 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
                'user-agent' => self::USER_AGENT,
            ],
            'max_duration' => 10,
        ],
        array_merge_recursive($this->getDefaultHttpClientOptions(), $options),
    );

    $cleanOptions = $this->cleanOptionsFromConfidentialData($options);

    if ($options === $cleanOptions) {
        return ($this->httpClientFactory)($options);
    }

    $scopedOptionsByRegex = [];

    foreach ($this->getRootPageUriCollection()->all() as $rootPageUri) {
        $scopedOptionsByRegex[preg_quote($this->getOriginFromUri($rootPageUri))] = $options;
    }

    return new ScopingHttpClient(($this->httpClientFactory)($cleanOptions), $scopedOptionsByRegex);
}
// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:226-247 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
foreach ($options as $k => $v) {
    if ('headers' === $k) {
        foreach ($v as $header => $value) {
            if (\in_array(strtolower($header), ['authorization', 'cookie'], true)) {
                continue;
            }

            $cleanOptions['headers'][$header] = $value;
        }

        continue;
    }

    if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
        continue;
    }

    $cleanOptions[$k] = $v;
}

Symfony HttpClient authentication options are auth_basic and auth_bearer; Contao's own manual documents auth_basic for crawler Basic Authentication. Because the cleaner only strips basic_auth and bearer_auth, the "clean" default client for non-root-page hosts still carries the real auth options. The existing factory test intends to assert that Authorization is not sent to www.foreign-domain.com, but its mock client factory ignores the $defaultOptions argument, so it does not catch auth options that survive into HttpClient::create($cleanOptions).

Suggested Mitigation

Strip the actual Symfony HttpClient authentication option keys from the clean client. Include NTLM as a defensive extension because Symfony documents it as another auth option.

-            if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
+            if (\in_array($k, ['auth_basic', 'auth_bearer', 'auth_ntlm', 'basic_auth', 'bearer_auth'], true)) {
                 continue;
             }

Also update the factory test so the mock factory records or preserves $defaultOptions; otherwise the test does not verify what HttpClient::create($cleanOptions) receives in production.

Impact

  • Direct primitive: disclosure of crawler Basic/Bearer credentials to an external host reached by the crawler.
  • Chain potential: if those credentials protect a staging or pre-publication environment, an attacker can use them to access that environment. The impact depends on what the leaked credential unlocks.
  • Realistic exploitation: a content editor adds a link to https://attacker.example/probe on a page that the crawler visits. When an administrator or scheduled maintenance run starts the broken-link checker with crawler Basic/Bearer authentication configured, the request to the attacker URL includes the generated Authorization header.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistcontao/contao4.13.0&&< 5.3.475.3.47composer require contao/contao:^5.3.47
🐘Packagistcontao/contao5.4.0&&< 5.7.75.7.7composer require contao/contao:^5.7.7
🐘Packagistcontao/core-bundle4.13.0&&< 5.3.475.3.47composer require contao/core-bundle:^5.3.47
🐘Packagistcontao/core-bundle5.4.0&&< 5.7.75.7.7composer require contao/core-bundle:^5.7.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for contao/contao, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update contao/contao to 5.3.47 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes `Cookie` and `Authorization` headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names `basic_auth` and `bearer_auth` instead of Symfony HttpClient's real `auth_basic` and `auth_bearer` options. When `contao.crawl.default_http_client_options` contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" cli
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6: contao/contao | O3 Security