GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6
LOWGHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is a low-severity (CVSS 2.6) Information Exposure vulnerability in contao/contao. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Contao crawler leaks auth credentials to external hosts
Blast Radius
contao/contao🐘contao/contao🐘contao/core-bundle🐘contao/core-bundleReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes Cookie and Authorization headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names basic_auth and bearer_auth instead of Symfony HttpClient's real auth_basic and auth_bearer options.
When contao.crawl.default_http_client_options contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials.
Technical Detail
Root Cause
// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:175-209 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
private function createHttpClient(array $options = []): HttpClientInterface
{
$options = array_merge_recursive(
[
'headers' => [
'accept' => 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
'user-agent' => self::USER_AGENT,
],
'max_duration' => 10,
],
array_merge_recursive($this->getDefaultHttpClientOptions(), $options),
);
$cleanOptions = $this->cleanOptionsFromConfidentialData($options);
if ($options === $cleanOptions) {
return ($this->httpClientFactory)($options);
}
$scopedOptionsByRegex = [];
foreach ($this->getRootPageUriCollection()->all() as $rootPageUri) {
$scopedOptionsByRegex[preg_quote($this->getOriginFromUri($rootPageUri))] = $options;
}
return new ScopingHttpClient(($this->httpClientFactory)($cleanOptions), $scopedOptionsByRegex);
}
// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:226-247 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
foreach ($options as $k => $v) {
if ('headers' === $k) {
foreach ($v as $header => $value) {
if (\in_array(strtolower($header), ['authorization', 'cookie'], true)) {
continue;
}
$cleanOptions['headers'][$header] = $value;
}
continue;
}
if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
continue;
}
$cleanOptions[$k] = $v;
}
Symfony HttpClient authentication options are auth_basic and auth_bearer; Contao's own manual documents auth_basic for crawler Basic Authentication. Because the cleaner only strips basic_auth and bearer_auth, the "clean" default client for non-root-page hosts still carries the real auth options. The existing factory test intends to assert that Authorization is not sent to www.foreign-domain.com, but its mock client factory ignores the $defaultOptions argument, so it does not catch auth options that survive into HttpClient::create($cleanOptions).
Suggested Mitigation
Strip the actual Symfony HttpClient authentication option keys from the clean client. Include NTLM as a defensive extension because Symfony documents it as another auth option.
- if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
+ if (\in_array($k, ['auth_basic', 'auth_bearer', 'auth_ntlm', 'basic_auth', 'bearer_auth'], true)) {
continue;
}
Also update the factory test so the mock factory records or preserves $defaultOptions; otherwise the test does not verify what HttpClient::create($cleanOptions) receives in production.
Impact
- Direct primitive: disclosure of crawler Basic/Bearer credentials to an external host reached by the crawler.
- Chain potential: if those credentials protect a staging or pre-publication environment, an attacker can use them to access that environment. The impact depends on what the leaked credential unlocks.
- Realistic exploitation: a content editor adds a link to
https://attacker.example/probeon a page that the crawler visits. When an administrator or scheduled maintenance run starts the broken-link checker with crawler Basic/Bearer authentication configured, the request to the attacker URL includes the generatedAuthorizationheader.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | contao/contao | ≥ 4.13.0&&< 5.3.47 | 5.3.47 |
| 🐘Packagist | contao/contao | ≥ 5.4.0&&< 5.7.7 | 5.7.7 |
| 🐘Packagist | contao/core-bundle | ≥ 4.13.0&&< 5.3.47 | 5.3.47 |
| 🐘Packagist | contao/core-bundle | ≥ 5.4.0&&< 5.7.7 | 5.7.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for contao/contao. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update contao/contao to 5.3.47 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.