GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj
HIGHpnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
pnpmnpmDescription
pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass
Summary
A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.
Details
pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:
File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)
if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}
This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.
However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():
File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)
export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
// ...
if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir } // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies
const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
// ...
rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig), // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
}
// Runs npm/pnpm install
await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
// Runs prepare scripts
for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) { // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
}
}
The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.
Affected scripts that execute during fetch:
prepareprepublishprepack
Attack vectors:
git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.gitgithub:attacker/maliciousgitlab:attacker/maliciousbitbucket:attacker/maliciousgit+ssh://[email protected]/attacker/malicious.gitgit+file:///path/to/local/repo
PoC
Prerequisites:
- pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
- git
Steps to reproduce:
-
Extract the attached poc.zip
-
Run the PoC script:
cd poc chmod +x run-poc.sh ./run-poc.sh -
Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:
cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt
Manual reproduction:
-
Create a malicious package with a
preparescript:{ "name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0", "scripts": { "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\"" } } -
Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files
-
Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):
{ "dependencies": { "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg" } } -
Run
pnpm install- the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt
Impact
Severity: High
Who is impacted:
- All pnpm v10+ users
- Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
- CI/CD pipelines
Attack scenarios:
- Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during
pnpm install
What an attacker can do:
- Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
- Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
- Modify source code or inject backdoors
- Establish persistence or reverse shells
- Access the filesystem and network
Why this bypasses security expectations:
- pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
- Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
- There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
- The
onlyBuiltDependenciesconfiguration does not affect git dependencies
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | pnpm | ≥ 10.0.0&&< 10.26.0 | 10.26.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pnpm to 10.26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.