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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2025-69264 — pnpm

HIGHFix: pnpm/pnpm@73cc635

CVE-2025-69264 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-693 vulnerability in pnpm. A fix is available for pnpm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

pnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"

Also known asGHSA-379q-355j-w6rj
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-69264.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs63th percentile — riskier than 63% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.52%1.04%1.56%0.1%1.0%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

426other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
pnpmnpm
325.9Mdownloads / week

Description

pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass

Summary

A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.

Details

pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:

File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)

if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
  opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}

This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.

However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():

File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)

export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
  // ...
  if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir }  // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies

  const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
    // ...
    rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig),  // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
  }

  // Runs npm/pnpm install
  await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)

  // Runs prepare scripts
  for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) {  // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
    await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
  }
}

The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.

Affected scripts that execute during fetch:

  • prepare
  • prepublish
  • prepack

Attack vectors:

  • git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.git
  • github:attacker/malicious
  • gitlab:attacker/malicious
  • bitbucket:attacker/malicious
  • git+ssh://[email protected]/attacker/malicious.git
  • git+file:///path/to/local/repo

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
  • git

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Extract the attached poc.zip

  2. Run the PoC script:

    cd poc
    chmod +x run-poc.sh
    ./run-poc.sh
    
  3. Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:

    cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt
    

Manual reproduction:

  1. Create a malicious package with a prepare script:

    {
      "name": "malicious-pkg",
      "version": "1.0.0",
      "scripts": {
        "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\""
      }
    }
    
  2. Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files

  3. Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):

    {
      "dependencies": {
        "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg"
      }
    }
    
  4. Run pnpm install - the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted:

  • All pnpm v10+ users
  • Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
  • CI/CD pipelines

Attack scenarios:

  1. Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during pnpm install

What an attacker can do:

  • Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
  • Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
  • Modify source code or inject backdoors
  • Establish persistence or reverse shells
  • Access the filesystem and network

Why this bypasses security expectations:

  • pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
  • Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
  • There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
  • The onlyBuiltDependencies configuration does not affect git dependencies

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpm≥ 10.0.0&&< 10.26.010.26.0npm install pnpm@10.26.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
pnpmpnpm
≥ 10.0.0 && < 10.26.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 10.26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-69264 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2025-69264 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

# pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass ### Summary A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during `pnpm install`, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks `postinstall` scripts via the `onlyBuiltDependencies` mechanism, git dependencies can still execute `prepare`, `prepublish`, and `prepack` scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval. ### Details pnpm v10 introduced a security featur
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2025-69264: pnpm RCE — Fixed in 10.26.0