CVE-2024-32644 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) CWE-662 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v16. A fix is available for github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Evmos' transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-32644.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v7🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v6🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v5🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4+1 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Context
stateObject: represents the state of an account and is used to store its updates during a state transition. This is accomplished using two in memory Storage variables:originStorageanddirtyStorageStateDB: it is the general interface to retrieve accounts and holds a map of stateObjects.
Impact
An external contributor, @iczc, discovered a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the stateDB.Commit() method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the dirtyStorage and, if and only if it is different than the originStorage, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore.
Below, are described the steps to perform the attack:
- User send a tx to a smart contract (SC) that is calling a precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from A to B.
- The SC call the precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from B to A (revert of the previous).
- Once the transaction is executed, and the final Commit is performed, the state A will not be committed to the store because A is the same as
originStorage.
If the tx is executed correctly, this is what happens at the store level:
- Initial state A is loaded from the KVStore and the dirtyStorage is set to B.
- Before running the precompile, the
dirtyStorageis committed to the KVStore without changing theoriginStorage. - Now, since we have a
dirtyStorage, it is updated to the previous value A without changing theoriginStorage.
Since the tx executed correctly, the evm calls the commit to persist the dirtyStorage. However, since dirtyStorage is equal to originStorage, nothing will be changed.
To summarize, if a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is critical since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 | all versions | 17.0.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v16@v17.0.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v7 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v6 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v5 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/tharsis/evmos | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2 | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
evmosevmosDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v16, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 to 17.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-32644 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-32644 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.