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CVE-2024-32644

CRITICAL

CVE-2024-32644 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) CWE-662 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v16. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2024-32644 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Evmos' transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles

Also known asGHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6GO-2024-2715
Published
Apr 19, 2024
Updated
Jul 15, 2026
Affected
9 pkgs
Patched
1 / 9
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

9 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v7🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v6🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v5🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4+1 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the stateDB.Commit() method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the dirtyStorage and, if and only if it is different than the originStorage, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is critical since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Affected Packages

9 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v16all versions17.0.0
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v7all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v6all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v5all versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/tharsis/evmosall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/tharsis/evmos/v2all versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v16. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 to 17.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-32644 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2024-32644 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2024-32644. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we upd
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-32644 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2024-32644 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.