GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6
CRITICALGHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) CWE-662 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v16. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Evmos transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles
Blast Radius
github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v7🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v6🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v5🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v3🐹github.com/tharsis/evmos/v4+1 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Context
stateObject: represents the state of an account and is used to store its updates during a state transition. This is accomplished using two in memory Storage variables:originStorageanddirtyStorageStateDB: it is the general interface to retrieve accounts and holds a map of stateObjects.
Impact
An external contributor, @iczc, discovered a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the stateDB.Commit() method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the dirtyStorage and, if and only if it is different than the originStorage, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore.
Below, are described the steps to perform the attack:
- User send a tx to a smart contract (SC) that is calling a precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from A to B.
- The SC call the precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from B to A (revert of the previous).
- Once the transaction is executed, and the final Commit is performed, the state A will not be committed to the store because A is the same as
originStorage.
If the tx is executed correctly, this is what happens at the store level:
- Initial state A is loaded from the KVStore and the dirtyStorage is set to B.
- Before running the precompile, the
dirtyStorageis committed to the KVStore without changing theoriginStorage. - Now, since we have a
dirtyStorage, it is updated to the previous value A without changing theoriginStorage.
Since the tx executed correctly, the evm calls the commit to persist the dirtyStorage. However, since dirtyStorage is equal to originStorage, nothing will be changed.
To summarize, if a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is critical since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 | all versions | 17.0.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v7 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v6 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v5 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/tharsis/evmos | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/tharsis/evmos/v2 | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v16. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 to 17.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.