CVE-2024-32880 — pyload-ng
CRITICALCVE-2024-32880 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability in pyload-ng. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
pyLoad allows upload to arbitrary folder lead to RCE
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-32880.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pyload-ngReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authenticated user can change the download folder and upload a crafted template to the specified folder lead to remote code execution
Details
example version: 0.5 file:src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py
@bp.route("/render/<path:filename>", endpoint="render")
def render(filename):
mimetype = mimetypes.guess_type(filename)[0] or "text/html"
data = render_template(filename)
return flask.Response(data, mimetype=mimetype)
So, if we can control file in the path "pyload/webui/app/templates" in latest version and path in "module/web/media/js"(the difference is the older version0.4.20 only renders file with extension name ".js"), the render_template func will works like SSTI(server-side template injection) when render the evil file we control.
in /settings page and the choose option general/general, where we can change the download folder.
Also, we can find the pyLoad install folder in /info page
So, we can change the value of Download folder to the template path. Then through /json/add_package we can upload a crafted template file to RCE.
@bp.route("/json/add_package", methods=["POST"], endpoint="add_package")
# @apiver_check
@login_required("ADD")
def add_package():
api = flask.current_app.config["PYLOAD_API"]
package_name = flask.request.form.get("add_name", "New Package").strip()
queue = int(flask.request.form["add_dest"])
links = [l.strip() for l in flask.request.form["add_links"].splitlines()]
pw = flask.request.form.get("add_password", "").strip("\n\r")
try:
file = flask.request.files["add_file"]
if file.filename:
if not package_name or package_name == "New Package":
package_name = file.filename
file_path = os.path.join(
api.get_config_value("general", "storage_folder"), "tmp_" + file.filename
)
file.save(file_path)
links.insert(0, file_path)
except Exception:
pass
urls = [url for url in links if url.strip()]
pack = api.add_package(package_name, urls, queue)
if pw:
data = {"password": pw}
api.set_package_data(pack, data)
return jsonify(True)
PoC
First login into the admin page, then visit the info page to get the path of pyload installation folder. Second, change the download folder to PYLOAD_INSTALL_DIR/ webui/app/templates/ Third, upload crafted template file through /json/add_package through parameter add_file the content of crafted template file and its filename is "341.html":
{{x.__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['eval']("__import__('os').popen('whoami').read()")}}
Last, visit http://TARGET/render/tmp_341.html to trigger the RCE
Impact
It is a RCE vulnerability and I think it affects all versions. In earlier version 0.4.20, the trigger difference is the pyload installation folder path difference and the upload file must with extension ".js" . The render js code in version 0.4.20:
@route("/media/js/<path:re:.+\.js>")
def js_dynamic(path):
response.headers['Expires'] = time.strftime("%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT",
time.gmtime(time.time() + 60 * 60 * 24 * 2))
response.headers['Cache-control'] = "public"
response.headers['Content-Type'] = "text/javascript; charset=UTF-8"
try:
# static files are not rendered
if "static" not in path and "mootools" not in path:
t = env.get_template("js/%s" % path)
return t.render()
else:
return static_file(path, root=join(PROJECT_DIR, "media", "js"))
except:
return HTTPError(404, "Not Found")
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pyload-ng | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
pyloadpyloadDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of pyload-ng for CVE-2024-32880. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Treat uploaded files as untrusted until proven otherwise: validate the actual content type rather than the supplied extension, store uploads outside the web root on a volume mounted without execute permission, and rename them to server-generated identifiers so an attacker cannot choose the path a request will later resolve.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-32880 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.