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📦 npm

GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj

Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix

Also known asCVE-2026-27738
Published
Feb 25, 2026
Updated
Apr 2, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk22th percentile+0.24%
0.00%0.27%0.53%0.80%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@angular/ssrnpm
629Kdownloads / week

Description

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com).

  1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router redirectTo or i18n locale switch).
  2. Angular receives ///evil.com as the prefix.
  3. It strips one slash, leaving //evil.com.
  4. The resulting string is used in the Location header.
  5. Modern browsers interpret // as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from https://your-app.com to https://evil.com.

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Attack Preconditions

  • The application must use Angular SSR.
  • The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.
  • The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the SSR process without sanitization.
  • The cache must not vary on the X-Forwarded-Prefix header.

Patches

  • 21.2.0-rc.1
  • 21.1.5
  • 20.3.17
  • 19.2.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in theirserver.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();
  if (prefix) {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

Resources

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@angular/ssr21.2.0-next.0&&< 21.2.0-rc.121.2.0-rc.1
📦npm@angular/ssr21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.1.521.1.5
📦npm@angular/ssr20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.1720.3.17
📦npm@angular/ssr19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.2119.2.21

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/ssr. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @angular/ssr to 21.2.0-rc.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`). 1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch). 2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix. 3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`. 4. The resulti
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.