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CVE-2026-33397 — @angular/ssr

Fix: angular/angular-cli#32771

CVE-2026-33397 is a Open Redirect vulnerability in @angular/ssr. A fix is available for @angular/ssr — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Angular SSR Vulnerable to Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass

Also known asGHSA-vfx2-hv2g-xj5f
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33397.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs18th percentile — riskier than 18% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.28%0.55%0.83%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

97other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@angular/ssrnpm
717Kdownloads / week

Description

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header:

  • An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., \evil.com).
  • The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid.
  • The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a Location header containing /\evil.com.
  • Modern browsers interpret the /\ sequence as //, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.

Furthermore, the response lacks the Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Patches

  • 22.0.0-next.2
  • 21.2.3
  • 20.3.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
  if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

References

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 22.0.0-next.0&&< 22.0.0-next.222.0.0-next.2npm install @angular/ssr@22.0.0-next.2
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.2.321.2.3npm install @angular/ssr@21.2.3
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.2120.3.21npm install @angular/ssr@20.3.21

Affected Products

1 product · 4 configurations
Application
angular cliangular
≥ 21.0.0 && < 21.2.3
1 version
22.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/ssr, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @angular/ssr to 22.0.0-next.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33397 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop reflecting attacker-controlled destinations: resolve every redirect target against an allowlist of paths or hosts you own, prefer a server-side key over a full URL in the request, and reject absolute URLs entirely where the flow only ever needs a relative one.

Frequently Asked Questions

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in `@angular/ssr` due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., `///`), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (`\`) bypass. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header: - An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., `\evil.com`). - The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid. - The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-33397: @angular/ssr — Fix Available