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CVE-2026-27738 — @angular/ssr

Fix: angular/angular-cli@877f017

CVE-2026-27738 is a Open Redirect vulnerability in @angular/ssr. A fix is available for @angular/ssr — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix

Also known asGHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj
Published
Updated
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-27738.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs29th percentile — riskier than 29% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.68%1.02%0.1%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

97other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@angular/ssrnpm
715Kdownloads / week

Description

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com).

  1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router redirectTo or i18n locale switch).
  2. Angular receives ///evil.com as the prefix.
  3. It strips one slash, leaving //evil.com.
  4. The resulting string is used in the Location header.
  5. Modern browsers interpret // as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from https://your-app.com to https://evil.com.

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Attack Preconditions

  • The application must use Angular SSR.
  • The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.
  • The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the SSR process without sanitization.
  • The cache must not vary on the X-Forwarded-Prefix header.

Patches

  • 21.2.0-rc.1
  • 21.1.5
  • 20.3.17
  • 19.2.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in theirserver.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();
  if (prefix) {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

Resources

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 21.2.0-next.0&&< 21.2.0-rc.121.2.0-rc.1npm install @angular/ssr@21.2.0-rc.1
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.1.521.1.5npm install @angular/ssr@21.1.5
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.1720.3.17npm install @angular/ssr@20.3.17
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.2119.2.21npm install @angular/ssr@19.2.21

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/ssr, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @angular/ssr to 21.2.0-rc.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-27738 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop reflecting attacker-controlled destinations: resolve every redirect target against an allowlist of paths or hosts you own, prefer a server-side key over a full URL in the request, and reject absolute URLs entirely where the flow only ever needs a relative one.

Frequently Asked Questions

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`). 1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch). 2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix. 3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`. 4. The resulti
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-27738 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-27738: @angular/ssr — Fixed in 21.2.0-rc.1