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Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor blockGHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43

Fix: mareforma/mareforma#58

GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43 is a CWE-345 vulnerability in mareforma. A fix is available for mareforma — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-71534
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs0th percentile — riskier than 0% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍mareforma

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

What's wrong

During restore, transparency_logged is recomputed as 1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0, where bundle_has_rekor comes only from a rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle. That derivation is wrong in both directions.

First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (attach_rekor_entry in mareforma/signing/rekor.py leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited claims.toml can add "rekor": {"uuid": "x"} to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor" state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against [rekor_inclusions] or the log. Tampering with claims.toml is the exact threat model restore defends against; _verify_claim_signatures_on_restore checks only payload and signatures.

Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with transparency_logged=1 (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires transparency_logged = 1, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no rekor_url configured, refresh_unsigned() is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from transparency_logged=1 to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.

Severity and impact

High. An attacker who edits claims.toml can mark claims Rekor-witnessed and REPLICATED-eligible without them ever having been logged. Meanwhile the common honest configuration (signed, no Rekor) has its trust state silently degraded by every catastrophic-loss restore, with no recovery path.

Location

  • mareforma/db/restore.py:376 reads toml_logged from the TOML and probes the bundle for a rekor.uuid
  • mareforma/db/restore.py:385 computes resolved_transparency from the unsigned rekor block alone
  • mareforma/db/core.py:1401 the REPLICATED convergence gate requires c.transparency_logged = 1

Fix direction

Do not derive transparency_logged from an unsigned envelope field. When a rekor block is present, require a matching, cryptographically verified [rekor_inclusions] entry (via verify_rekor_inclusion against the pinned log public key) whose hashedrekord spec.data.hash equals the SHA-256 of the claim's signed payload before setting 1; otherwise set 0.

When the claim is signed and neither the bundle nor the graph carries Rekor coordinates, restore the write-time value: the TOML omits transparency_logged unless it was 0, so treat an absent flag plus no rekor bundle as 1 (the column default for non-Rekor writes).

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImareforma≥ 0.3.0&&< 0.3.80.3.8pip install --upgrade 'mareforma==0.3.8'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mareforma, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mareforma to 0.3.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## What's wrong During restore, `transparency_logged` is recomputed as `1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0`, where `bundle_has_rekor` comes only from a `rekor.uuid` field inside `signature_bundle`. That derivation is wrong in both directions. First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (`attach_rekor_entry` in `mareforma/signing/rekor.py` leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited `claims.toml` can add `"rekor": {"uuid": "x"}` to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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