CVE-2026-71534 — mareforma
Fix: mareforma/mareforma@cccbf4eCVE-2026-71534 is a CWE-345 vulnerability in mareforma. A fix is available for mareforma — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor block
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
mareformaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
What's wrong
During restore, transparency_logged is recomputed as 1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0, where bundle_has_rekor comes only from a rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle. That derivation is wrong in both directions.
First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (attach_rekor_entry in mareforma/signing/rekor.py leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited claims.toml can add "rekor": {"uuid": "x"} to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor" state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against [rekor_inclusions] or the log. Tampering with claims.toml is the exact threat model restore defends against; _verify_claim_signatures_on_restore checks only payload and signatures.
Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with transparency_logged=1 (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires transparency_logged = 1, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no rekor_url configured, refresh_unsigned() is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from transparency_logged=1 to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.
Severity and impact
High. An attacker who edits claims.toml can mark claims Rekor-witnessed and REPLICATED-eligible without them ever having been logged. Meanwhile the common honest configuration (signed, no Rekor) has its trust state silently degraded by every catastrophic-loss restore, with no recovery path.
Location
mareforma/db/restore.py:376readstoml_loggedfrom the TOML and probes the bundle for arekor.uuidmareforma/db/restore.py:385computesresolved_transparencyfrom the unsigned rekor block alonemareforma/db/core.py:1401the REPLICATED convergence gate requiresc.transparency_logged = 1
Fix direction
Do not derive transparency_logged from an unsigned envelope field. When a rekor block is present, require a matching, cryptographically verified [rekor_inclusions] entry (via verify_rekor_inclusion against the pinned log public key) whose hashedrekord spec.data.hash equals the SHA-256 of the claim's signed payload before setting 1; otherwise set 0.
When the claim is signed and neither the bundle nor the graph carries Rekor coordinates, restore the write-time value: the TOML omits transparency_logged unless it was 0, so treat an absent flag plus no rekor bundle as 1 (the column default for non-Rekor writes).
Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.
Quality bar
SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mareforma | ≥ 0.3.0&&< 0.3.8 | 0.3.8pip install --upgrade 'mareforma==0.3.8' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mareforma, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update mareforma to 0.3.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-71534 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-71534 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.